Consequences of Brexit on the competition law and policy of the United Kingdom and the European Union

The subject matter of this paper are the short-term and long-term consequences of Brexit, a historical event and a turning point in the development of the European Union (EU), as well as for the United Kingdom (UK) and the EU competition law and policy. The article first provides a comparative analysis of the historical development of legal regulation of competition in the UK and the EU, including relevant cases from the practice of competition authorities. In particular, the authors focus on the decisions of the European Commission regarding anti-cartel policy. The article further examines to what extent Brexit will influence the mergers and acquisitions policy, antitrust policy, anti-cartel policy, and state aid policy in the UK and the EU. The central question refers to the extent of Brexit's influence on the change of the UK and the EU business environment, and the repercussions that this change will have for the competition law. In the concluding remarks, the authors discuss the direction of future development of the UK competition law, particularly in terms of whether and to what extent the UK law will be harmonized with the EU competition law and case law in this area, or whether there will be a radical turn towards adopting a completely new concept of competition law and policy.

The impact of EU cartel policy reforms on the timing of settlements in private follow-on damages disputes—an empirical assessment of cases from 2001 to 2015

Private cartel damages litigation is on the rise in Europe since early 2000. This development has been initiated by the European courts and was supported by various policy initiatives of the European Commission, which found its culmination in the implementation of the EU Directive on Antitrust Damages end of 2016. This article explores the impact of this reform process on effective compensation of damaged parties of cartel infringements. For that purpose, we analyse all European cartel cases with a decision date between 2001 and 2015, for which we analyse litigation activity and speed. Overall, we find a substantial reduction of the time until the first settlement (increase in litigation speed) together with a persisting high share of cases being litigated (high litigation activity). This supports the view that the reform not only increased the claimant’s expectation about the amount of damages being awarded but also resulted in an alignment in the expectations of claimants and defendants in the final damages amount, ie the European Commission succeeded in reaching its objective to clarify and harmonize legal concepts across Europe.

Politik Kartel di Tingkat Lokal: Studi Pemilihan Wakil Gubernur Kepulauan Riau Periode Sisa 2016-2021

This paper discusses the behavior of political party in Deputy Governor election (Pilwagub) at Riau Islands Province (Kepri) 2017 with rational choice and cartel politics approach. The DPRD of Riau Islands Provincial decision to to choose and assign Isdianto as Deputy Governor requires controversy, it is caused by the domination of one coalition over the other in the 2015 Governor election. This study argues that the motive for power in inter-party relations at the local level, especially those who have seats in Parliament of Riau Islands Province, tends to influence DPRD’s decision. Political parties effort at the local level through electoral changes are characterized by the pragmatism of political parties. The parties that competed in the 2015 Pilgub challenged reconciliation since the 2017 governor election. The findings of this study are those that discuss cartel policy through unseen agreements that are reflected in the DPRD's plenary decision by acclamation.

Wide Prospects and Ravines of Competition Policy

The goals of competition policy have been a subject of debate almost since its inception. Competition agencies in developing countries are tasked with a wider range of goals than their counterparts in developed countries due to specific traits of the economic and institutional environment of the former. Goal complementarity, path-dependence, comparative efficiency of other government agencies and market characteristics specific to developing countries might make antitrust tools more effective and efficient in dealing with problems that are not strictly antitrust-related. However, no goals are 100% complementary, and can sometimes come into conflict. The mechanisms chosen to prioritize the goals can influence the outcome for competition as well as social and consumer welfare. Additionally, even if the goals are conventional, they can be misinterpreted in the course of implementing competition policy. The paper examines Russia’s recent National Plan for the Development of Competition in the Russian Federation for 2018-2020 and some of the goals postulated there to show how they correspond to the theory of industrial organization and the principles of law and economics. A similar analysis is done on the recent Report on regional development of competition in its section on cartels, which shows how the indicators chosen by the FAS Russia to evaluate its cartel policy can shift the emphasis of enforcement, lead to enforcement errors and distort the incentives of the authority itself as well as economic entities.