Ennius-Zitat (F 142 TrRF) oder -Imitation?

As the late antique Terence commentator Aelius Donatus notes, by using the term parodia, which is misleading from a modern point of view, Terence imitates Ennius in a passage in the Eunuchus (Eu. 590). Researchers have used this comment as well as Donatus’ use of the adverb tragice as an opportunity to extract a fragment from an unknown tragedy by Ennius (F 142 TrRF). This fragment remains somewhat of a mystery, because there is uncertainty about where the corresponding quotation begins and where it ends. According to the analysis presented here, we are not dealing with a parody in our sense, and at most partially with an Ennius fragment, since parodia denotes the modified quotation in ancient usage. In a new solution, a fragment from Ennius’ Annales (fr. 555f. Skutsch) is proposed as the pretext for the parodia.

Evolving Dharma Consciousness of Dharmaputra Yudhishthira within the Mahabharata

The objective of the paper to comprehend a deep implication of what dharma meant to Yudhishthira through the length of historical events related to war and philosophical questioning on the issue. He had to fight through so much in terms of pitting his intuitive understanding of dharma against a whole gamut of mundane ideas of what dharma stood for. For instance, his struggle with his brothers on the complexity of svadhrama and its rejoinder in form of sukshadharma or knowledge of subtle consciousness. His inner conflict continued and there came a time in the last parva, Svargarohana parva, when he just denounced dharma. It was through these trials and tribulations that Yudhishthira was finally able to evolve his own idea of what real truth, conduct, duty, morality and inner consciousness were about. In other words what was true dharma. Through this paper the author attempts to tease out complexities of the philosophical queries that bothered Yudhishthira and also trace his historical trajectory in the quest. The method of investigation would include historicizing the text. This means locating our source, the Mahabharata, on a time line and within a geographical expanse so that we get an idea when the logic of dharma mutated and in what particular region. The text had an expansive period of formulation right from the 8th Century BCE to 4th Century CE, that is, what we understand as the Gupta period. But the text had many later regional recensions as well. We are primarily looking at the older Sanskrit version of the text as recorded in V.S.Sukthankar edited Critical edition (Bhandarkar Oriental edition, Poona) of the Mahabharata. The exercise also requires reading of the magnum opus, locating the usage of the term in association with Yudhishthira and raising some significant issues. These may include queries such as what is dharma according to the Mahabharata. Is definition fixed or is it dynamic? Do all people speak of it with the same voice? Is the notion of dharma same for Yuthishthira and his Pandava brothers? Does his wife. Draupadi, subscribe to his idea of dharma? If his notion of dharma changes over time, does it have anything to do with changing consciousness of the society or at least some people within the society? Can we get a sense of a subtle move towards a shift from karma yoga to jnana yoga and finally to bhakti yoga? In this changing paradigm where do we locate the dharma philosophy of Dharmaputra Yudhishthira, especially as there comes a time when he himself begins questioning the idea of dharma? In a sense his character brings out the dilemmas arising out of the differences in meanings and approaches of comprehending the complexities associated with the concept of dharma. Another point of our methodology would be to understand the etymology of the term dharma and its location in the ancient language. The Sanskrit root of the word is dhr, 'to support', 'to sustain'. In other words, it means that whereby whatever lives, is sustained, upheld, supported. More often than not, the word dharma in its ancient usage denoted the moral realm in its widest sense, meaning both morality as an ideal— man's eternal quest for the good, the right, the just—as well as the given, actual framework of norms, rules, maxims, principles that guide human action. It was integral to the doctrine of purushartha or that of the four goals of a human being; these being artha (success/material possessions), kama (passion/procreation), dharma (virtue/religious duty), moksha (self-perfection). All the four are intertwined. Throughout the epic we witness the evolution of Yudhishthira’s notion of true dharma. What comes out strongly is his holding fast to the value of nonviolence (anrishṃsya), his identification with the sukshma or subtle nature of dharma, his insistence on constricted use of brute force as a part of Kshatriya dharma, his ultimate benevolence towards his family and people. These were actually revealed to be the cause of his indisputable success in Dharma’s recurrent tests. Somewhere by the end of the epic, Yudhishthira’s error in entering into the game of dice, getting in conflict with his brothers on the issue of his duty and not being able to answer Draupadi’s queries initially appear as stepping stones in self-realization to a deeper understanding of what dharma as duty, conduct, search for truth and morality were all about. The orderly world of dharma, which was so central to his character, was eventually arrived at only through repeated trials and tribulations

Immortality in ancient philosophy

In Greco-Roman philosophy immortality is discussed in two contexts: as an uncontroversial attribute of the gods and as a highly controversial attribute of human souls. Subdividing this latter topic, one may discern a more metaphysical question about whether every human soul as such is immortal in virtue of its nature or essence, and a more ethical topic about whether certain souls may enjoy a greater degree or share of immortality through adopting a certain mode of life. (This sub-topic is joined to the first main topic, to the extent that the virtuous agent’s approximation to immortality is part of their imitation of god or homoiōsis theōi). Several Presocratic philosophers held that human souls are immortal, but it is Plato who first offers extensive arguments for this claim, as well as extensive reflections on the ethical import of personal immortality. Aristotle’s psychology leaves little room for the soul’s immortality, and it remains controversial whether he wished to leave any whatsoever. Discussions of immortality and its ethical consequences are similarly downplayed in surviving Stoic sources. The Epicureans gleefully argued the contrary view that a virtuous outlook depends on our conviction that we are irredeemably mortal. Only with the resurgence of Platonism in the Common Era does the soul’s immortality become once again a commonplace among philosophers. The connection between this and the Christian belief in resurrection is complicated. It is presumably due to the ascendancy of this double legacy that current popular usage counts it as nearly tautological that souls are immortal, but acknowledges a real question of whether human beings have souls, where ancient usage accepted as a near tautology that all living beings have souls, but admitted wide dispute over whether souls are immortal or not.

Reflections on the concept of symmetry

The concept of symmetry is omnipresent, although originally, in Greek antiquity, distinctly different from the modern logical notion. In logic a binary relation R is called symmetric if xRy implies yRx. In Greek, ‘being symmetric’ in general usage is synonymous with ‘being harmonious’, and in technical usage, as in Euclid's Elements, it is synonymous with ‘commensurable’. Due to the second meaning, which is close to the etymology of συ´μμετρoς, ‘with measure’ has likewise to be read as ‘being [in] rational [ratios]’ and displays the origin of the concept of rationality of establishing a proportion. Heraclitus can be read as a master of such connections. Exercising rationality is a case of simultaneously finding and inventing symmetries. On that basis a proposal is made of how to relate the modern logical notion of symmetry, a second-order concept, on the one hand with modern first-order usages of the term symmetric in geometry and other fields, and on the other hand with the notion of balance that derives from the ancient usage of symmetric. It is argued that symmetries as states of balance exist only in theory, in practice they function as norms vis-à-vis broken symmetries.

"Jew" and related terms in the ancient world

This article discusses the applications of linguistic markers for "Jew," "Israel," and other terms in the ancient world. Ancient usage indicates that Ioudaios changed from being primarily an ethno-geographic ("Judean") to a primarily religio-cultural ("Jew") term. This change prepared for the sometimes positive, but predominantly negative, Christian use of the term as a boundary marker. Christian appropriation of "Israel" was different; here the positive uses outweigh the negative. By contrast the positive or neutral sense of "Hebrew(s)" was shared by Jewish and Christian sources alike.

Ancient Amazons ‘ Heroes, Outsiders or Women?

The network of associations of the word Amazon still plays a part in the shorthand of modern discourse. Its connotations may vary from a slightly comic praise of sporting excellence in women to underlying insinuations that Amazons are not quite feminine. When applied by politicians and journalists to the women in the Peace Camp at Greenham Common during the 1980s, for example, the epithet Amazon carried the implication that these women rejected men and had developed a society apart (therefore (sịc) they must be subversives, lesbians, communists, hippies – etc. etc.). Modern usage perhaps emphasizes the unusual or even threatening associations; Amazons are, for whatever reason, outside the ‘normal’ parameters of life-style and achievements. Ancient usage presupposed an additional element, Amazons as a subject for artistic and poetic interest. The reasons why this was so do much to explain how and why the image of the Amazons communicated certain associations and how these in turn relate to underlying assumptions about the framework of Greek society and its values.

Plato's Simile of Light Again

The similes of the Sun, Line, and Cave in the Republic remain a reproach to Platonic scholarship because there is no agreement about them, though they are meant to illustrate. I propose to analyse the form of the argument, a clue that has never been properly weighed. The Greek theory and practice of analogia and diairesis give good evidence about the method that Plato adopted; if this usage were respected, the analogical argument would not be so loosely interpreted, and the double diairesis and proportion that the Line actually is could not be mistaken for a classification. I hope also to show that Plato's terminology is definite and consistent; here too ancient usage helps to establish his meaning.