Rational Assent and Self-determination to the Better or the Worse

This chapter discusses three philosophers in the Damascian tradition: Damascius himself, Simplicius in his Commentary on Epictetus’s Handbook, and Ps-Simplicius in his Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima. These philosophers develop the idea that the rational soul engages in a kind of activity that is strictly self-reflexive, but that can be either right or wrong. This is an activity by which the soul makes itself either better or worse. Ps-Simplicius spells out the nature of this activity in his account of the operation of rational faculties. This account makes it possible to explain what is distinctive about the rational capacity for assent. Because it is exercised self-reflexively, this capacity can be reason-responsive: one can assent (and revise one’s assent) on the basis of reasons. The chapter argues that the fact that human beings are capable of this kind of reason-responsiveness helps to explain why they are responsible for their actions.

Evidence for the rationalisation phenomenon is exaggerated

The evidence for rationalization, which motivates the target article, is exaggerated. Experimental evidence shows that rationalization effects are small, rather than gross and, I argue, largely silent on the pervasiveness and persistence of the phenomenon. At least some examples taken to show rationalization also have an interpretation compatible with deliberate, knowing, reason-responsiveness on the part of participants.

Evidence for the rationalisation phenomenon is exaggerated

The evidence for rationalisation, which motivates the target article, is exaggerated. Experimental evidence shows that rationalisation effects are small rather than gross and, I argue, largely silent on the pervasiveness and persistence of the phenomenon. At least some examples taken to show rationalisation also have an interpretation compatible with deliberate, knowing reason-responsiveness on the part of participants.

Reasons and Emotions

Because there are different kinds of emotions and different kinds of reasons, the question of the relation between emotions and reasons splits into several ones. This chapter focuses on whether emotions can inform us about normative reasons for actions. It starts with a brief defense of the claim that the Perceptual Theory, according to which emotions are perceptual experiences of values, is better placed than its main competitors, Feeling Theories and Conative Theories. On the basis of this, the chapter argues for two claims: that when things go well, emotions allow us to track our practical reasons, and that under certain conditions, which involve a kind of “standby control,” we are able not only to track reason, but to manifest reason-responsiveness when we act on our emotions. The upshot is that an agent can manifest reason-responsiveness even if she acts akratically, that is, against her better judgment.

Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness

Epistemic Sentimentalism is the view that emotional experiences such as fear and guilt are a source of immediate justification for evaluative beliefs. For example, guilt can sometimes immediately justify a subject’s belief that they have done something wrong. This chapter focuses on a family of objections to Epistemic Sentimentalism that all take as a premise the claim that emotions possess a normative property that is apparently antithetical to it: epistemic reason-responsiveness, i.e., emotions have evidential bases and justifications can be demanded of them. This chapter responds to these objections whilst granting that emotions are reason-responsive. This is not only dialectically significant vis-à-vis the prospects for Epistemic Sentimentalism, but also supports a broader claim about the compatibility of a mental item’s being reason-responsive and its being a generative source of epistemic justification.

Addiction, recovery and moral agency: Philosophical considerations

Uusitalo, S. (2015). Addiction, recovery and moral agency: Philosophical considerations. The International Journal Of Alcohol And Drug Research, X(Y), N-M. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.7895/ijadr.vXiY.190 Aims: The purpose of this paper is to argue that it is important to recognize that addicts are morally accountable even for their addictive action, as moral agency is more generally an important factor in full-blown human agency. The challenge is to identify the problems that addicts have in their agency without discarding their potentially full-blown agency. Design: In philosophy of agency, moral responsibility and accountability, in particular, may refer to control over one’s action. I discuss this control as reason-responsiveness and, on a more general level, illustrate the importance of moral agency to human agency with a contrasting example of psychopaths and addicts as agents. Measures: A philosophical analysis is carried out in order to argue for the relevance and importance of moral accountability in therapeutic models of addiction. Findings: The example of psychopaths and addicts illustrates that moral agency is part of full-blown human agency, as psychopaths are generally believed to lack moral skills common to non-psychopathic individuals. I argue that addicts are not analogous to psychopaths in the framework of moral agency in this respect. Conclusions: By fleshing out the conceptual considerations in the framework of addiction therapies, I clarify the relevance and importance of moral accountability in therapeutic models of addiction. If evidence-based therapies attempt to restore the addict’s full-fledged agency at least in respect to addiction, then acknowledging addicts’ moral accountability for their action does matter.

Addiction, recovery and moral agency: Philosophical considerations

Uusitalo, S. (2015). Addiction, recovery and moral agency: Philosophical considerations. The International Journal Of Alcohol And Drug Research, X(Y), N-M. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.7895/ijadr.vXiY.190 Aims: The purpose of this paper is to argue that it is important to recognize that addicts are morally accountable even for their addictive action, as moral agency is more generally an important factor in full-blown human agency. The challenge is to identify the problems that addicts have in their agency without discarding their potentially full-blown agency. Design: In philosophy of agency, moral responsibility and accountability, in particular, may refer to control over one’s action. I discuss this control as reason-responsiveness and, on a more general level, illustrate the importance of moral agency to human agency with a contrasting example of psychopaths and addicts as agents. Measures: A philosophical analysis is carried out in order to argue for the relevance and importance of moral accountability in therapeutic models of addiction. Findings: The example of psychopaths and addicts illustrates that moral agency is part of full-blown human agency, as psychopaths are generally believed to lack moral skills common to non-psychopathic individuals. I argue that addicts are not analogous to psychopaths in the framework of moral agency in this respect. Conclusions: By fleshing out the conceptual considerations in the framework of addiction therapies, I clarify the relevance and importance of moral accountability in therapeutic models of addiction. If evidence-based therapies attempt to restore the addict’s full-fledged agency at least in respect to addiction, then acknowledging addicts’ moral accountability for their action does matter.