A Disproportionate Policy Perspective on the Politics of Crisis Management

Disproportionate policy response—which is composed of two core concepts, namely policy overreaction and under-reaction—is typically understood to be a lack of “fit” or balance between the costs of a public policy and the benefits deriving from this policy and/or between a policy’s ends and means. The disproportionate policy perspective introduces an intentional component into disproportionate response. It represents a conceptual turn whereby the concepts of policy overreaction and under-reaction are reentering the policy lexicon as types of intentional policy responses that are largely undertaken when political executives are vulnerable to voters. In times of crisis, disproportionate policy responses may be intentionally designed, implemented as planned, and sometimes successful in achieving policy goals and in delivering the political benefits sought by the political executives who design them. The premise underlying this argument is that crises vary in many respects, some of which may incentivize a deliberate crisis response by political executives that is either excessive, or lacking. For example, when crises occur at times of electoral vulnerability, the relevancy of policy instruments’ visibility, theatricality, spectacularity, and popularity may dominate the calculus of crisis management decisions. The same applies in cases where strong negative emotions emerge, and subsequently, political executives may opt to overwhelm hysterical populations cognitively and emotionally, trying to convince them that the policy system is viable.

Policy overreaction styles during manufactured crises

This article focuses on governments’ attempts to intensify crises for political gain, and identifies a series of unnecessary crisis management responses that follow distinctive policy overreaction styles. It is based on the premise that political executives at times face incentives to shape voters’ perceptions regarding the timing and scope of a crisis, even though no crisis actually exists. Analysing Trump’s response towards the so-called ‘invasion’ by a caravan of asylum seekers, the article identifies three distinctive crisis overreaction policy styles: communicating in absolutes, performing in absolutes, and challenging the rule of law. Each of these overreaction styles includes a specific set of tool preferences; an active means of implementation; and an impositional manner of execution. By highlighting the potential advantages of marrying the concept of crisis to the ideas of policy overreaction and policy style, this article makes an important contribution to our understanding of the politics of crisis management.

Law and Order and the Risk of Policy Overreaction

Chapter 6 shows how an initial turn toward a harsher policy stance on law and order can set in motion positive policy feedback and lead to policy overreaction. It discusses the mechanisms that may lead to such overreaction building on Pierson’s framework. From the empirical evidence gathered, it seems plausible that especially the valence character of security-related issues, which make them issues on which elections can be won, creates a dynamic leading to policy feedback. However, this depends on the extent of the initial policy change: whereas overreaction can be diagnosed in the United Kingdom and France, the cases of Germany and Sweden show that positive feedback is not necessarily the case.

Policy overreaction

The literature on policy success and failure does not capture policies that may be too successful, as well as “too much” and/or “too soon” patterns of policy. To bridge this gap, this conceptual article relies on one of the most robust findings in the psychology of judgement, namely that many people are overconfident, prone to place too much faith in their intuitions. Based on this premise, the analytical framework advanced here revolves around two key dimensions of policy overreaction: (i) the effects of positive and negative events, and (ii) the effects of overestimation and accurate estimation of information. Based on these dimensions, the article identifies and illustrates four distinct modes of policy overreaction that reflect differences in the nature of implemented policy. It argues that the policy tools menu utilised in each mode of policy overreaction is dominated by unique mechanisms for changing or coordinating behaviour, which, once established, produce excessive – objective and/or perceived – social costs.