A Priori Physicalism

Physicalism is a thesis in metaphysics: the nature of the mind and its states are such that we need no more than the physical properties to give a complete account of them. According to a priori physicalism, this thesis in metaphysics implies a thesis about a priori entailment. If the thesis in metaphysics is true, a sufficiently rich account of a subject—you, me, or … —given in physical terms a priori entails how that subject is mentally. Why do some physicalists want to make things difficult for themselves by embracing a priori physicalism; why do they believe that a posteriori physicalism—a prima facie less demanding version of physicalism—is not an option? This is the topic of this chapter. As we will see, there are a number of reasons that have or might be given.

Why Phenomenal Zombies Are Conceivable Whereas Anti-Zombies Are not

In this article, I discuss Keith Frankish’s attempt to neutralize the zombie argument against materialism with a closely parallel argument for physicalism, the anti-zombie argument, and develop David Chalmers’ reply to this species of arguments. I support Chalmers’ claim that the conceivability of situations like the existence of an anti-zombie is problematic with an analysis that makes it plausible that the idea of an anti-zombie is incoherent, and argue that to counter this, a materialist should deny the absence of a priori entailment from the physical to the phenomenal; however, this would involve the denial of the conceivability of zombies and so make the anti-zombie argument superfluous.