The Patterns of Conceptual Representation and the Symbolic Exchange: Marx’s Construal of Systemic Effects in New Contexts [In Eng. + Rus.]

The paper is devoted to historical and philosophical analysis of the patterns of conceptual representation in the theoretical models of scientific cognition which not only rely on Marx's construal of systemic effects, but also imply some new contexts. The umbrella term "systemic effects" implies a peculiar mode of action of whatever complex system that cannot be explained by referring to the theoretical model of the linear cause-effect relationships between the elements and should be interpreted as the consequence of a certain degree of complexity of the system itself. Marx did not develop the original idea of representation as an explicit and complete theory, but he introduced the methodology of the analysis of the systemic effects that can be applied to the analysis of representation to wide extent. It is pointed out that the scientific cognition issued the challenge of reliable representations for the object domain and they tended to take the shape of conceptual models. The representation, being generally the substitution of one entity for another, is considered as an aspect of pervasive social symbolization that occurs against a background of systemic effects in exactly the same way as the economic processes. It is concluded that just modified Marx's stance became essential for the consideration of the forms of abstractive thinking, the formation of concepts, and the representational models both in general and in respect to specific problems of epistemology and philosophy of science.

Peeling the Onion of Brain Representations

The brain's function is to enable adaptive behavior in the world. To this end, the brain processes information about the world. The concept of representation links the information processed by the brain back to the world and enables us to understand what the brain does at a functional level. The appeal of making the connection between brain activity and what it represents has been irresistible to neuroscience, despite the fact that representational interpretations pose several challenges: We must define which aspects of brain activity matter, how the code works, and how it supports computations that contribute to adaptive behavior. It has been suggested that we might drop representational language altogether and seek to understand the brain, more simply, as a dynamical system. In this review, we argue that the concept of representation provides a useful link between dynamics and computational function and ask which aspects of brain activity should be analyzed to achieve a representational understanding. We peel the onion of brain representations in search of the layers (the aspects of brain activity) that matter to computation. The article provides an introduction to the motivation and mathematics of representational models, a critical discussion of their assumptions and limitations, and a preview of future directions in this area.

Embodied Cognition

Embodied cognition theory has become central to contemporary sociologists who theorize and empirically study the mechanics of thinking. Those applying this approach to thought treat meaning-making as quite distinct from the processes described in abstract representational models of cognition. Moving beyond sole considerations of neural operations, embodied cognition theory views meaning-making as deeply entwined in the body’s experience with surrounding environments. To fully unpack the importance of this shift in studying thought, this chapter begins by exploring the roots of embodied cognition theory; it then traces its rather recent entry into the sociological literature. The chapter moves on to summarize the growing number of empirical sociological works informed by embodied cognition theory, and it touches on the methodological debates surrounding work in this area. The chapter concludes by suggesting ways in which sociology can forward the embodied cognition project.

Refining the bigger picture: On the integrative memory model

The integrative memory model contains multiple subsystems. In this commentary, the processes within these subsystems are questioned. First, the assumption that familiarity largely reflects perceptual fluency is examined. Next, the distinction between “process” and “representational” models of temporal lobe function is challenged. Finally, the “relational representation core system” (or “extended hippocampal system”), which is central to the model, is especially sketchy. Here, I highlight key questions to be addressed in order to understand this system's role in trace formation.

Turning From Parents: Psychological Distancing and Attachment-Related Changes in Regret for Immediate Contact in Emerging Adulthood

This longitudinal study examined how emerging adults psychologically distance themselves from parents. Every week during their first semester at college, participants ( n = 71, M age = 18 years [ SD = 0.48]) read hypothetical vignettes describing emotionally salient situations they could encounter at college. Participants then provided information about whether they would regret not being in immediate contact with parents versus peers when dealing with the aftermath of these situations. Results suggested that participants were separating themselves from parents in a dynamic manner over time, which was revealed in varying levels of regret for not possibly being in immediate contact with parents following emotional events. Moreover, compared to participants with negative representational models of parents, participants with positive models reported more consistent patterns of regret for not having immediate parental contact. This study provides new insights into normative attachment dynamics beyond childhood and how emerging adults reorganize their attachment hierarchies.

Causal reasoning in rats' behaviour systems

Conceiving of stimuli and responses as causes and effects, and assuming that rats acquire representational models of causal relations from Pavlovian procedures, previous work by causal model theory proponents attempted to train rat subjects to represent stimulus A as a cause of both stimulus B and food. By these assumptions, with formal help from Bayesian networks, self-production of stimulus B should reduce expectation of alternative causes, including stimulus A, and their effects, including food. Reduced feeder-directed responding to stimulus B when self-produced has been taken as evidence for a general causal reasoning capacity among rats involving mental maps of causal relations. Critics have rejoined that response competition can explain these effects. The present research replicates the key effect, but uses continuous and finer-grained measurement of a broader range of behaviours. Behaviours not recorded in previous studies contradict both prior explanations. Even results cited in support of these explanations, when measured in finer detail and continuously over longer periods, show patterns not expected by either view, but supportive of a specific-process approach with attention to motivational factors. Still, the abstract prediction from Bayesian networks holds, providing a potentially complementary normative analysis. Behaviour systems theory provides firmer framing for such theories than representational-map alternatives.

The challenge of the sublime

The challenge of the sublime argues that the unprecedented visual inventiveness of the Romantic period in Britain could be seen as a response to theories of the sublime, more specifically to Edmund Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757). While it is widely accepted that the Enquiry contributed to shaping the thematics of terror that became fashionable in British art from the 1770s, this book contends that its influence was of even greater consequence, paradoxically because of Burke’s conviction that the visual arts were incapable of conveying the sublime. His argument that the sublime was beyond the reach of painting, because of the mimetic nature of visual representation, directly or indirectly incited visual artists to explore not just new themes, but also new compositional strategies and even new or undeveloped pictorial and graphic media, such as the panorama, book illustrations and capricci. More significantly, it began to call into question mimetic representational models, causing artists to reflect about the presentation of the unpresentable and the inadequacy of their endeavours, and thus drawing attention to the process of artistic production itself, rather than the finished artwork. By revisiting the links between eighteenth-century aesthetic theory and visual practices, The challenge of the sublime establishes new interdisciplinary connections which address researchers in the fields of art history, cultural studies and aesthetics.

Embodied Cognition and Human-Machine Coexistence

Recently, we discussed the relative importance of direct perception, embodiment, metaphors, and ethics for cooperative human-machine coexistence. The present paper deepens the examination of embodiment and direct perception by considering differences between computational and representational models on one hand and embodied cognition on the other. We found that to achieve true artificial intelligence (AI) and, hence, a cooperative human-machine coexistence, research must overcome the limitations of computational and representational models. This can be reached by connecting machines to the world through bodies that exhibit sensory and motor skills as demonstrated by embodied cognition. Furthermore, substantial improvement in AI could be achieved by adopting a hybrid framework in which embodiedcognition, for example, may contain representational, abstract, and symbolic aspects. The adoption of such a “both and” instead of “either or” view is a more realistic approach for progress in AI applications.