Ibn-Rushd (Averroes). The Incoherence of the Incoherence. Part Four

This series of publications is a translation of selected sections from the book “The Incoherence of the Incoherence” (Tahafut at-Tahafut) by a peripatetic philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198), written in response to the book by asharite mutakallim al-Ghazali (d. 1111) “The Incoherence of the Philosophers” (Tahafut al-Falasifa).In this part Ibn Rushd completes the analysis of al-Ghazali’s criticism of the philosophical proofs for the eternity of the world. Here are the answers to the last part of Ghazalian objections to the second proof (“from the eternity of time”), as well as to the objections to the third (“from the eternity of possibility”) and the fourth (“from the eternity of matter”).

Ibn-Rushd (Averroes). The Incoherence of the Incoherence. Part Three

This series of publications is a translation of selected sections from the book “The Incoherence of the Incoherence” (Tahafut at-Tahafut) of peripatetic philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198), written in response to the book of asharite mutakallim al-Ghazali (d. 1111) “The Incoherence of the Philosophers” (Tahafut al-Falasifa). In this part Ibn Rushd examines the second of two objections raised by al-Ghazali against the main proof for the eternity of the world – “from complete cause” (in Ghazali’s wording, “impossibility of the temporal proceeding from absolute eternity”), as well as his criticism of another proof based on the eternity of time (in two formulations).

Averroës’ Takfīr of al-Ghazālı̄: Ta’wīl and Causal Kufr

Al-Ghazālı̄ famously claims in the Incoherence of the Philosophers that al-Fārābī and Avicenna are unbelievers because they hold philosophical positions that conflict with Islam. What is less well-known, however, is that Averroës claims in the Decisive Treatise that al-Fārābī and Avicenna are not unbelievers; rather, al-Ghazālı̄ is the true unbeliever for writing the Incoherence of the Philosophers. In this paper, my aim is to present a sustained reconstruction of Averroës’ legal and philosophical argument for why al-Ghazālı̄ is an unbeliever. The crux of Averroës’ argument is that al-Ghazālı̄ has expressed false allegorical interpretations of scripture to unqualified persons, which has caused them to fall into unbelief. By being causally responsible for other people’s unbelief, al-Ghazālı̄ is an unbeliever as well.

Humanity And Divinity Are The Objects Of Sufi Teachings

Philosophy, especially Eastern philosophy, has always developed in harmony with religion, religious teachings. It is true that at one-time Imam al-Ghazali in his "Tahafut ul-Falasifa" (“Incoherence of the Philosophers”) opposed philosophers, sharply criticized their sixteen metaphysical and four physical rules, and sought to absolutize the divine will, which, although it gained followers and successes in this respect, cannot eliminate the harmony [1] between philosophy and religion, humanity, and divinity. Perhaps he brought Ibn Rushd into the world of philosophy, and Ibn Rushd became famous for illuminating the relationship between philosophy and religion [2].

Ibn-Rushd (Averroes).The Incoherence of the Incoherence. Part Two

(Translation from Arabic into Russian, intoduction and comments)This series of publications is a translation of selected sections from the book «The Incoherence of the Incoherence» (Tahafut at-Tahafut) of a peripatetic philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198), written in response to the book of asharite mutakallim al-Ghazali (d. 1111)«The Incoherence of the Philosophers» (Tahafut al-Falasifa). The first of these sections and the longest one is devoted to the question of the world’s eternity.In this part Ibn Rushd continues examining the first of the two objections raised by al-Ghazali as the main proof for the pre-eternity of God’s creation – «from the complete cause», or, in Ghazaliane wording, «It is impossible that the temporal should proceed from the absolutely eternal». According to this objection, it is the God’s eternal will that predetermined the specific moment when the world came into being.

On Averroes’ response to al-Ghazali’s critique of philosophy

The article serves as an introduction to the translation of the book «The Incoherence of the Incoherence» (Tahafut at-Tahafut) by the peripatetic philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–1198), written in response to the work of the theologian-asharite al-Ghazali (1058–1111) «The Incoherence of the Philosophers» (Tahafut al-Falasifa). The paper highlights the motives of al-Ghazali’s attack on Muslim peripatetism (Falsafa) and its infl uence on the fate of this school in the Muslim world. The research describes the basic understanding of the Falsafa picture of the world that comes as a framework for the discussions unfolding the fi rst of the three main points of al-Ghazali’s criticism, which is the thesis of the world eternity. The connection between Ibn Rushd’s book and his earlier theological and polemical treatises as «On the Correlation between Philosophy and Religion» and «On the Methods of Proof for the Principles of Creed» is shown.

Al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111)

In his Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifa) al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) addresses in twenty discussions teachings of the falāsifa and tries to show that these are not proven demonstratively. The falāsifa in al-Ghazālī’s book are mostly Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d. 427/1037) and his followers. By exposing the nondemonstrative character of these teachings, al-Ghazālī aims at destroying the conviction of the falāsifa that their sciences are superior to revelation. Al-Ghazālī argues that many teachings handed down from one generation of falāsifa to the next are merely based on the blind emulation (taqlīd) of authorities such as Aristotle. Thus he creates the impression of falsafa as a quasi-religious tradition that lies outside of Islam. In the Incoherence of the Philosophers he applies numerous strategies of integrating the movement of falsafa into Islam. Part of that strategy is his condemnations of three key teachings as unbelief and apostasy from Islam. Incoherence

Al-Ghazālī’s Moderation in Belief

Al-Ghazali (Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Tusi al-Ghazali,1058-1111) is one of the most important thinkers in the history of Islamic andArabic thought. He lived and wrote at the height of the intellectual ferment ofIslam. Originally from Tus (in modern day Iran), he traveled extensivelythroughout the Muslim world. Al-Ghazali was a leading religious intellectualduring his lifetime; he was a jurist (faqīh), a theologian (mutakallim), as wellas a Sufi. Three of his most famous works are: The Incoherence of the Philosophers,Deliverer from Error, and Revivification of the Religious Sciences. Thefirst work contains al-Ghazali’s famous and devastating attack on philosophy,and while it deals in large measure with theology and theological claims, it isprincipally a refutative work. In this book, al-Ghazali investigates philosophicaldoctrines and criticizes philosophers for holding many heretical opinions,especially for three blasphemous views that are deserving of death: the beliefin the pre-eternity of the world (in effect denying God’s creation of the world),the denial of God’s knowledge of particulars, and the denial of the resurrectionof bodies and their assembly at the Day of Judgment. This work is largely ...

AL-ĠAZĀLĪ'S PHILOSOPHERS ON THE DIVINE UNITY

The medieval Islamic philosophers held a certain conception of the divine unity that assumes the necessary existent to be both one and simple. The oneness of the necessary existent meant that it is the only necessary existent and its simplicity meant that it admits no composition whatsoever – it is pure essence and its essence is necessary existence. In The Incoherence of the Philosophers al-Ġazālī presents, with elaboration, an exposition of the philosophers' conception of the divine unity, several arguments for its two components (i.e., oneness and simplicity), and his critique of these arguments. In this paper I focus on six of the arguments attributed to the philosophers. Following the textual evidence, I reconstruct these arguments and offer two possible interpretations of them. The first interpretation, which I call the many-argument interpretation, sees one of the arguments as employing the simplicity of the necessary existent to establish its oneness and the other five arguments as invoking oneness to establish simplicity. The second interpretation, which I call the one-argument interpretation, doesn't offer a new reading for the first argument but sees the other five arguments as defending the simplicity of the necessary existent based on its basic concept. I argue for the superiority of the one-argument interpretation.