Addressing Moral Confusion: The Right and Wrong of Exploitation

Sometimes voluntary agreements that are beneficial to all parties can still be unethical. This occurs when the benefits of the agreement are unfairly divided among the parties. The benefits of a mutually beneficial transaction might be exploitative, meaning that one party unconscionably takes advantage of the vulnerability of another party. World poverty, globalization, and environmental disasters present a special challenges where exploitation could occur, but also where people’s good intentions might cause them to refuse to make trades that are beneficial for fear of being exploitative.

Heidegger II

Following claims that Being and Time was essentially philosophical anthropology, and questions about the embodiment and mortality of Dasein, and Heidegger recurred to the distinction between humans who, as being-there, create a “world” for themselves and confront their death resolutely, versus animals who are caught up in their natural environments and do not die so much as “perish” biologically. In 1929 he studied the work of gestalt biologists like Jakob von Uexküll to support his arguments for the world-poverty of animals, unable hermeneutically to forge a real “world.” By 1936, nevertheless, his logic faltered when he argued that the age of technology and giganticism had reduced most humans to mere “technicized animals.” Even if this was a rhetorical flourish, it remained that only an anxious few remained among us who could dwell poetically and be free for their death, an idea with significant implications for the metaphysical politics Heidegger developed in response to Nazi politics. By 1949, the technicized animal—poor in world—appeared to perish with no greater resoluteness and dignity than its animal relatives.

Occidental Mindoro 1983

In the 1970s the relief organization World Vision “de-Americanized.” Recipient nations from Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa became full partners of World Vision International. These new global voices urged a more structural approach to world hunger and poverty. By the early 1990s, World Vision, a behemoth NGO of one hundred entities overseen by 6,000 full-time staff, had transformed, in fits and starts, from an American-dominated, relief-oriented charity to an international organization that stressed partnerships and long-term solutions to world poverty. This chapter, which charts the trajectory of evangelical social justice work in the postwar era, describes the promise and limits of development work on the Filipino island of Occidental Mindoro.

Repensando as políticas globais de erradicação da pobreza

<p><span>Rethinking global poverty eradication policies</span></p><p><span><br /></span></p><p><span>RESUMO<br />A pobreza é um dos problemas mais difíceis a serem enfrentados pelos formuladores de políticas públicas, pois as famílias pobres estão mais sujeitas à falta de abrigo, dependência de drogas, problemas de saúde, gravidez na adolescência, analfabetismo, desemprego e baixo grau de escolaridade, não havendo dúvidas de que ela esteja associada a diversosmales econômicos e sociais, o que demonstra que o problema da pobreza mundial é latente e evidente e demanda discussões práticas e teóricas na busca de meios para sua erradicação. Nesse diapasão surgem os organismos internacionais que juntamente com a sociedade civil buscam apresentar políticas globais para erradicação dessa pobreza. Para tanto, o presente artigo fará uma abordagem das atuais políticas globais para erradicação da pobreza e como a aplicação de princípios éticos pode contribuir nesse processo. Seu objetivo geral é analisar a importância da ética para a efetivação de políticas globais para a erradicação da pobreza. Foi dividido em duas partes: a primeira tratando das políticas globais de erradicação de pobreza e a segunda a dimensão ética da sustentabilidade nas políticas globais de combate à pobreza mundial. Para sua elaboração foi utilizado o método indutivo, com as técnicas do referente, das categorias e do fichamento.<br /></span></p><p><span><br />ABSTRACT<br />Poverty is one of the most difficult problems to be faced by public policy makers, as poor families are more subject to homelessness, drug addiction, health problems, teenage pregnancy, illiteracy, unemployment and low education, there is no doubt that it is associated with several economic and social ills, which demonstrates that the problem of world poverty is latent and evident and demands practical and theoretical discussions in the search for ways to eradicate it. In this fork, international organizations appear that together with civil society seek to present global policies to eradicate this poverty. Therefore, this article will approach the current global policies for poverty eradication and how the application of ethical principles can contribute to this process. Its general objective is to analyze the importance of ethics for the implementation of global policies for the eradication of poverty. The article is divided into two parts: the first dealing with global poverty eradication policies and the second the ethical dimension of sustainability in global policies to combat world poverty. For elaboration, the inductive method was used, with the techniques of referent, categories and file.</span></p>

Thomas Pogge’s Conception of Taking the Global Institutional Order as the Object of Justice Assessments

Might our reasoning about social justice at the domestic level—for instance, with regard to the kind of objects that our justice assessments are immediately concerned with and the content of principles employed—properly diverge from its counterpart at the global level? This is the question around which much of the current global justice debate revolves. This chapter is devoted to examining and arguing that the answers provided by Thomas Pogge for the most part retain their plausibility despite the barrage of criticism they have provoked. While Pogge is particularly renowned for his contention that existing world poverty constitutes an injustice that implicates ordinary citizens of affluent societies in negative duty violations, this chapter will not be directly weighing in on this debate. Rather, it seeks to examine a fundamental commitment in Pogge’s justice theorizing: if we are to take the basic institutional scheme of a domestic society as the primary subject of justice in virtue of its profound and pervasive effects, then consistency requires us to subject the global institutional scheme to the same type of justice analysis, and to devise a corresponding set of principles governing its design. Through clarifying the meaning and implications of this proposition, this chapter hopes to bring out a more lucid and unified reading of Pogge’s institutional approach to justice theorizing, one that is both appealing and remains viable in the absence of a world government.