Shame, Embarrassment, and the Subjectivity Requirement

Reactive theories of responsibility see moral accountability as grounded on the capacity for feeling reactive-attitudes. I respond to a recent argument gaining ground in this tradition that excludes psychopaths from accountability. The argument relies on what Paul Russell has called the 'subjectivity requirement'. On this view, the capacity to feel and direct reactive-attitudes at oneself is a necessary condition for responsibility. I argue that even if moral attitudes like guilt are impossible for psychopaths to deploy, that psychopaths, especially the "successful" and "secondary" subtypes of psychopathy, can satisfy the subjectivity requirement with regard to shame. I appeal to evidence that embarrassment and shame are grounded on the same affective process and data that psychopathic judgments about embarrassment are neurotypical. If I am right, then psychopaths ought to be open to shame-based forms of accountability including shame punishments. I conclude by considering why psychopaths rarely self-report shame. I argue that lacking a capacity to see oneself as flawed is a different sort of failure than lacking the capacity to feel.

Critical Notice: Paul Russell’s The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (OUP 2008)

In The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (2008), Paul Russell makes a strong case for the claim that “The primary aim of Hume’s series of skeptical arguments, as developed and distributed throughout the Treatise, is to discredit the doctrines and dogmas of Christian philosophy and theology with a view toward redirecting our philosophical investigations to areas of ‘common life, ’ with the particular aim of advancing ‘the science of man’”; (2008, 290). Understanding Hume in this way, according to Russell, sheds light on the “ultimate riddle”; of the Treatise: “is it possible to reconcile Hume’s (extreme) skeptical principles and conclusions with his aim to advance the ‘science of man’”; (2008, 3)? Or does Hume’s skepticism undermine his “secular, scientific account of the foundations of moral life in human nature”; (290)? Russell’s controversial thesis is that “the irreligious nature of Hume’s fundamental intentions in the Treatise”; is essential to solving the riddle (11). Russell makes a compelling case for Hume’s irreligion as well as his atheism. Contrary to this interpretation I argue that Hume is an irreligious theist and not an atheist.