Ethics without theory? On advantages of the Pyrrhonian over the dogmatic way of life.

The paper discusses two interrelated problems pertaining to the Pyrrhonian way of life. We try to rise to the challenge and play devil’s advocate, arguing from the skeptical point of view. The first part portrays a reconstruction of central skeptical arguments against the dogmatic ethics that attack some epistemological, metaphysical and ethical issues of the central dogmatic concept “the good by nature”. The second part considers the arguments suggested by G. Striker and R. Bett who claim that the sceptic cannot have ethics nor be an ethical agent. Against it, we try to formulate minimal conditions for ethics without theory, namely, the conceptual ability to distinguish between “right” and “wrong” actions grounded upon the notion of “private good” and the skeptical criteria for actions. This is made possible by relativizing the criteria of the ethical and connecting it with the customs and traditions of a given community. Though Pyrrhonism is quite different from ethical relativism or ethical realism, a striking comparison to H. Putnam’s ethical approach is drawn at the end of the paper.

Zen Buddhism and the Space of Ethics

This essay discusses Buddhist ethics from Zen and Huayan Buddhist perspectives. It proposes that Zen Buddhist ethics underlines the importance of the ethical agent’s awareness of the fundamental gap between the reality of the world and the agent’s capacity to fully understand the total reality, and this gap inevitably creates a tension in the ethical agent’s mind. This tension is a positive guideline that demands of the ethical agent a constant and consistent self-reflection when making ethical decisions. Moral norms can offer a contour of our ethical life, but, from the Zen and Huayan perspectives, crucial to ethical reasoning is one’s capacity to be aware of multifaceted causes and conditions that generate an event and the venerability of the ethical agent’s hermeneutic capacity to fully grasp the total realty. Ethics emerges in the space of this tension when the tension is positively channeled through the moral agent’s self-cultivation.

Ethical Justice and Political Justice

The purpose of Aristotle's discussion of political justice (τò πoλιτικòν δικαιoν) in EN V.6-7 has been a matter of dispute. Although the notion of political justice which Aristotle seeks to elucidate is relatively clear, namely the notion of justice which obtains between free and equal citizens living within a community aiming at self-sufficiency under the rule of law, confusion arises when one asks how political justice relates to the other kinds of justice examined in EN V. Is political justice a highly determinate subdivision of justice which Aristotle examines alongside the other varieties of particular justice analyzed in EN V.2-5? Or is political justice related to the analysis of ethical agency which follows in EN V.8-11? The question is complicated by the fact that the passage in question – EN V 1134a17-1135a15 – has occasioned much speculation about textual dislocations and has been incorporated into chapter divisions differently according to the two prevalent modern editorial divisions of the Ethics.To resolve these problems, I argue that Aristotle's account of political justice is situated within an extended aporetic analysis which begins in EN V.6 and extends through EN V.8. Aristotle introduces the notion of political justice within the extended analysis concerning the ascription of character states because calling someone just or unjust presupposes that the person is a fully mature ethical agent, but anyone capable of political justice possesses such agency. Once the extended argument in the second half of EN V is properly understood, it appears that the received text is not in need of emendation. To further support my claim that Aristotle's account of political justice introduces a new inquiry which is not analogous to the analyses of particular justice in the first half of EN V, I compare political justice to the other species of justice.