judgment internalism
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2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Udayan Mukherjee

<p>Norms suffuse our lives and are a major part of the way that we understand and structure the social world. This thesis provides an account of normative judgment that illuminates the nature of this uniquely human competence. The main argument pursued is that understanding normative judgment requires a direct and sustained understanding of its social functions. Within philosophy, discussion of normativity has often been confined to the moral domain. One major theme of this thesis is the broadening of this focus to include other domains that are rightfully considered normative. Another philosophical shibboleth is the tendency to explain features of human psychology from a conceptual perspective. A second theme of the thesis will be the insistence that empirical research is a useful addition to the project of understanding normativity. I present these ideas in three stages. First, I show why it is plausible to believe in the unity of normative domains and defend a conceptual thesis of Normative Judgment Internalism that sees norms as fundamentally bound up with reasons. Secondly, I outline a puzzle that any theory of normative judgment must answer and then critique orthodox Humean and anti-Humean theories that fail to provide such a solution. Thirdly, I explore empirical research about the nature of normative judgment and tentatively endorse a model of normative cognition that is informed by my earlier arguments.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Udayan Mukherjee

<p>Norms suffuse our lives and are a major part of the way that we understand and structure the social world. This thesis provides an account of normative judgment that illuminates the nature of this uniquely human competence. The main argument pursued is that understanding normative judgment requires a direct and sustained understanding of its social functions. Within philosophy, discussion of normativity has often been confined to the moral domain. One major theme of this thesis is the broadening of this focus to include other domains that are rightfully considered normative. Another philosophical shibboleth is the tendency to explain features of human psychology from a conceptual perspective. A second theme of the thesis will be the insistence that empirical research is a useful addition to the project of understanding normativity. I present these ideas in three stages. First, I show why it is plausible to believe in the unity of normative domains and defend a conceptual thesis of Normative Judgment Internalism that sees norms as fundamentally bound up with reasons. Secondly, I outline a puzzle that any theory of normative judgment must answer and then critique orthodox Humean and anti-Humean theories that fail to provide such a solution. Thirdly, I explore empirical research about the nature of normative judgment and tentatively endorse a model of normative cognition that is informed by my earlier arguments.</p>


2018 ◽  
pp. 67-87
Author(s):  
Daniel Greco

It’s commonly held that the best metaethical account of our normative thought and language won’t place any significant constraints on our first-order normative theorizing; once we have the right metaethics, we can go on having the same first-order normative debates, and accepting the same first-order normative views. This thesis of the “autonomy of ethics” is particularly popular among writers in the expressivist tradition. This chapter argues, however, that broadly expressivist metanormative commitments have significant consequences in first-order normative epistemological debates. It begins with the example of judgment internalism—a thesis endorsed by expressivists, but many non-expressivists as well. While judgment internalism is generally seen as irrelevant to first-order ethical debates, it is argued here that it has significant consequences for some putatively “first-order” debates in epistemology. It is then argued that accepting more thoroughly expressivist metaepistemological commitments has more far-reaching epistemological consequences, focusing on the internalism/externalism debate.


Author(s):  
Colin Marshall

This chapter extends Compassionate Moral Realism with an eye towards the issue of judgment internalism, that is, whether moral representation is necessarily connected to motivation. The challenges of giving a uniform account of the cognitive and motivational aspects of moral judgment are illustrated, and the possibility of a non-uniform, pluralist view is considered. After noting Compassionate Moral Realism’s compatibility with judgment pluralism, accounts are offered of both emotionally hot and emotionally cool moral judgments, using Chapter 12’s partial analysis of objective badness. In each case, a necessary connection to moral motivation is identified. For emotionally cool judgments, an agent who is not motivated is epistemically lacking by a standard that she acknowledges in that very judgment. Finally, it is explained how the present view can offer an attractive understanding of moral perception, as understood by Lawrence Blum and others.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-490
Author(s):  
CAROLINE T. ARRUDA

AbstractI show that an overlooked feature of our moral life—moral status—provides a route to vindicating naturalist moral realism in much the same way that the Humean theory of motivation and judgment internalism are used to undermine it. Moral status presents two explanatory burdens for metaethical views. First, a given view must provide an ecumenical explanation of moral status, which does not depend on the truth of its metaethical claims (say, that there are mind-independent facts about moral status). Second, its explanation must be consistent with persistent normative ethical disagreement about what constitutes moral status. I conclude that naturalist moral realism succeeds, while quasi-realism fails because it cannot meet the latter requirement. This argument has three results: we have a new route for metaethical vindication more generally and for naturalist moral realism in particular; quasi-realism's plausibility is undermined by an inability to explain disagreement, but not for the familiar reasons.


dialectica ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-408
Author(s):  
Thorsten Sander
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-144
Author(s):  
Wim de Muijnck

AbstractRalph Wedgwood's The Nature of Normativity provides a theory about the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of normative judgments, taken to be judgments of the form 'I ought to '. The theory is based on the principle of Normative Judgment Internalism, and the principle that 'the intentional is normative'. I argue, first, that by being merely about oughts, Wedgwood's account leaves out one essential constituent of normativity: value. Secondly, I argue that mainly because of this, the account faces a serious issue of relevance.


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