The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality

There is a widespread cross-cultural stereotype suggesting that atheists are untrustworthy and lack a moral compass. Is there any truth to this notion? Building on theory about the cultural, (de)motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, the present research investigated whether there are reliable similarities as well as differences between believers and disbelievers in the moral values and principles they endorse. Four studies examined how religious disbelief (vs. belief) relates to endorsement of various moral values and principles in a predominately religious (vs. irreligious) country (the U.S. vs. Sweden). Two U.S. M-Turk studies (Studies 1A and 1B, N = 429) and two large cross-national studies (Studies 2–3, N = 4,193), consistently show that disbelievers (vs. believers) are less inclined to endorse moral values that serve group cohesion (the binding moral foundations). By contrast, only minor differences between believers and disbelievers were found in endorsement of other moral values (individualizing moral foundations, epistemic rationality). It is also demonstrated that presumed cultural and demotivational antecedents of disbelief (limited exposure to credibility-enhancing displays, low existential threat) are associated with disbelief. Furthermore, these factors are associated with weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations in both countries (Study 2). Most of these findings were replicated in Study 3, and results also show that disbelievers (vs. believers) have a more consequentialist view of morality in both countries. A consequentialist view of morality was also associated with another presumed antecedent of disbelief—analytic cognitive style.

“You can’t bullshit a bullshitter” (or can you?): Bullshitting frequency predicts receptivity to various types of misleading information

Research into both receptivity to falling for bullshit and the propensity to produce it have recently emerged as active, independent areas of inquiry into the spread of misinformation. However, it remains unclear whether those who frequently produce bullshit are inoculated from its influence. For example, both bullshit receptivity and bullshitting frequency are negatively related to cognitive ability and aspects of analytic thinking style, suggesting that those who frequently engage in bullshitting may be more likely to fall for bullshit. However, separate research suggests that individuals who frequently engage in deception are better at detecting it, thus leading to the possibility that frequent bullshitters may be less likely to fall for bullshit. Here we present 3 studies (N = 826) attempting to distinguish between these competing hypotheses, finding that frequency of persuasive bullshitting positively predicts bullshit receptivity (sensitivity) and that this association is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style.

Turking in the time of COVID

On March 16, 2020, the US Government introduced strict social distancing protocols for the United States in an effort to stem the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. This had an immediate major effect on the job market, with millions of Americans forced to find alternative ways to make a living from home. As online labor markets like Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) play a major role in social science research, concerns have been raised that the pandemic may be reducing the diversity of subjects participating in experiments. Here, we investigate this possibility empirically. Specifically, we look at 15,608 responses gathered in 23 studies run on MTurk between February and July 2020, examining the distribution of gender, age, ethnicity, political preferences, and analytic cognitive style. We find notable changes on some of the measures following the imposition of nationwide social distancing: participants are more likely to be less reflective (as measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test), and somewhat less likely to be white, Democrats (traditionally over-represented on MTurk), and experienced with MTurk. Most of these differences are explained by an influx of new participants into the MTurk subject pool who are more diverse and representative – but also less attentive – than previous MTurkers.

Wholist–analytic cognitive styles modulate object-based attentional selection

Previous studies have shown that individual difference plays an important role in the object-based cueing effect observed in experiments on attentional selection. A wide range of studies have also used the theory of cognitive style to explain individual strategies in most cognitive processes. However, the characteristics of individuals that modulate object-based attentional selection are still unclear. To investigate the modulation of object-based attention by cognitive style, this study used a classic two-rectangle paradigm and compared space-based effects and object-based effects for individuals who had been preselected as wholists or analysts in terms of cognitive style. The results revealed that a space-based effect was obtained for both wholist and analytic individuals. However, an object-based effect was obtained only for analysts and not wholists, regardless of object orientation. The results further indicated that a wholist versus analytic cognitive style can modulate object-based attention by way of perceptual grouping. Our study provides the first evidence that object-based attention can indeed be influenced by individual characteristics and extends traditional model of cognitive style by indicating that wholist individuals tend to group two or more objects in a scene into one larger gestalt.