Purely Consequentialist Legal Activism in the Brazilian Criminal Constitutional Jurisdiction based on Case Studies in the Jurisprudence of the Supreme Federal Court

The present study intended, based on the use of the methodology related to legal consequentialism, the field of consequentialist argumentation and possible risks of its use by judges, in particular, those who perform constitutional jurisdiction and efficient speeches and the concept of purely consequentialist activism, assess whether, and to what extent, it would be possible to divide the concept of purely consequentialist activism into degrees according to the legal nature of the decision handed down within the scope of the Supreme Federal Court, more specifically, with regard to the (non) provisionality of the decision. Throughout the work it was possible to divide purely consequentialist activism into two species. The first of these, called first degree consequentialist activism, characterized by monocratic decisions or judgments that respect the limits of merit and, consequently, the principle of collegiality, and; second-degree consequentialist activism, characterized by monocratic decisions that, not meeting the limits of precautionary decisions, end up disrespecting the principle of collegiality

L'analisi economica come argomentazione giuridica

RIASSUNTO:In primo luogo l’articolo considera l’analisi economica come un tipo di argomentazione giuridica. Gli argomenti che fanno leva sulle conseguenze economiche di un atto giuridico vengono considerati come una forma di argomentazione consequenzialista e viene osservato che tali argomenti competono con molti altri nel contesto dell’interpretazione e dell’applicazione giudiziale del diritto. In secondo luogo viene considerata la pretesa dell’analisi economica di concepire le norme giuridiche come incentivi e viene osservato che tale prospettiva dipende da una serie di argomenti metodologici e una serie di argomenti circa i valori da massimizzare e la razionalità degli agenti economici. ABSTRACT:Firstly, the article takes economic analysis as a type of legal argumentation. The arguments that leverage the economic consequences of legal acts are a form of consequentialist argumentation and it is noted that these arguments compete with many others in the context of judicial interpretation and application of law. Secondly, the claim of economic analysis to conceive of legal norms as incentives is considered and it is observed that this perspective depends on a series of methodological arguments and of arguments about the values to be maximized and the rationality of economic agents.

PREROGATIVES, RESTRICTIONS, AND RIGHTS

I offer a defense of the moral side-constraints to which Robert Nozick appeals in Anarchy, State and Utopia but for which he fails to provide a sustained justification. I identify a line of anti-consequentialist argumentation which is present in Nozick and which, in the terminology of Samuel Scheffler, moves first to affirm a personal prerogative which allows the individual not to sacrifice herself for the sake of the best overall outcome and second moves on to affirm restrictions (i.e., moral side-constraints) which prohibit the individual from suppressing others' exercise of their personal prerogatives even if that suppression would serve the overall good. I argue that one ought to follow this line of anti-consequentialist argumentation all the way to the affirmation of restrictions by showing that the rationale for the adoption of the personal prerogative is not satisfied unless the accompanying restrictions are adopted as well.