Decision Making and Games with Vector Outcomes

In this paper, we study decision making and games with vector outcomes. We provide a general framework where outcomes lie in a real topological vector space and the decision maker’s preferences over outcomes are described by a preference cone, which is defined as a convex cone satisfying a continuity axiom. Further, we define a notion of utility representation and introduce a duality between outcomes and utilities. We provide conditions under which a preference cone is represented by a utility and is the dual of a set of utilities. We formulate a decision-making problem with vector outcomes and study optimal choices. We also consider games with vector outcomes and characterize the set of equilibria. Lastly, we discuss the problem of equilibrium selection based on our characterization.

Exhaustive operators and vector measures

Let S be a compact Hausdorff space and let Φ: C(S)→E be a linear operator defined on the space of real-valued continuous functions on S and taking values in a (real) topological vector space E. Then Φ is called exhaustive (7) if given any sequence of functions fn ∈ C(S) such that fn ≧ 0 andthen Φ(fn)→0 If E is complete then it was shown in (7) that exhaustive maps are precisely those which possess regular integral extensions to the space of bounded Borel functions on S; this is equivalent to possessing a representationwhere μ is a regular countably additive E-valued measure defined on the σ-algebra of Borel subsets of S.