Untying Hands: De-escalation, Reputation, and Dynamic Audience Costs

Two states in a dispute refuse to back down. One ties its own hands to strengthen its stand and gain advantage; the other tries to untie the tied hands to preempt disadvantage. Tying hands is a well-studied strategy, but it tells only part of the story, and the response strategy of untying hands remains unexplored. Can a state untie the tied hands of its opponent to give freedom back to its opponent—the freedom to concede? I identify three strategies of untying hands: counterthreat, reassurance, and normative framing. I show experimentally that these strategies can reduce the public costs of backing down and the perceived reputational damage from backing down. Tied hands and audience costs are not static and immutable, but dynamic and malleable by the other side.

Disadvantaged Americans are suffering the brunt of rising pain and physical limitations

Using data from three national surveys of US adults (one cohort and two cross-sectional studies, covering the period from the mid-1990s to the mid-2010s), we quantify the degree to which disparities by socioeconomic status (SES) in self-reported pain and physical limitations widened and explore whether they widened more in midlife than in later life. Unlike most prior studies that use proxy measures of SES (e.g., education), we use a multidimensional measure of SES that enables us to evaluate changes over time in each outcome for fixed percentiles of the population, thereby avoiding the problem of lagged selection bias. Results across multiple datasets demonstrate that socioeconomic disparities in pain and physical limitations consistently widened since the late 1990s, and if anything, widened even more in midlife than in late life (above 75). For those aged 50–74, the SES disparities in most outcomes widened by more than 50% and in some cases, the SES gap more than doubled. In contrast, the magnitude of SES widening was much smaller above age 75 and, in the vast majority of cases, not significant. Pain prevalence increased at all levels of SES, but disadvantaged Americans suffered the largest increases. Physical function deteriorated for those with low SES, but there was little change and perhaps improvement among the most advantaged Americans. At the 10th percentile of SES, the predicted percentage with a physical limitation at age 50 increased by 6-10 points between the late-1990s and the 2010s, whereas at the 90th percentile of SES, there was no change in two surveys and in the third survey, the corresponding percentage declined from 31% in 1996–99 to 22% in 2016–18. The worst-off Americans are being left behind in a sea of pain and physical infirmity, which may have dire consequences for their quality of life and for society as a whole (e.g., lost productivity, public costs).

The potential direct economic impact and private management costs of an invasive alien species: Xylella fastidiosa on Lebanese wine grapes

Since its outbreak in 2013 in Italy, the harmful bacterium Xylella fastidiosa has continued to spread throughout the Euro-Mediterranean basin and, more recently, in the Middle East region. Xylella fastidiosa subsp. fastidiosa is the causal agent of Pierce’s disease on grapevines. At present, this alien subspecies has not been reported in Lebanon but if this biological invader was to spread with no cost-effective and sustainable management, it would put Lebanese vineyards at a certain level of risk. In the absence of an Xylella fastidiosa subsp. fastidiosa outbreak, the gross revenue generated by Lebanese wine growers is estimated as close to US$22 million/year for an average period of 5 years (2015–2019). The potential quantitative economic impacts of an Xylella fastidiosa subsp. fastidiosa outbreak and particularly, the private control costs have not been assessed yet for this country as well as for others which Xylella fastidiosa may invade. Here, we have aimed to estimate the potential direct economic impact on growers’ livelihoods and provide the first estimate of the private management costs that a theoretical Xylella fastidiosa subsp. fastidiosa outbreak in Lebanon would involve. For this purpose, we used a Partial Budget approach at the farm gate. For the country as a whole, we estimated that a hypothetical full spread of Xylella fastidiosa subsp. fastidiosa on Lebanese wine grapes would lead to maximum potential gross revenue losses of almost US$ 11 million for an average recovery period of 4 years, to around US$ 82.44 million for an average grapevine life span period of 30 years in which infected plants are not replaced at all. The first yearly estimated additional management cost is US$853 per potentially infected hectare. For a recovery period of 4 years, the aggregate estimated additional cost would reach US$2374/ha, while the aggregate net change in profit would be US$-4046/ha. Furthermore, additional work will be needed to estimate the public costs of an Xylella fastidiosa subsp. fastidiosa outbreak in Lebanon. The observed costs in this study support the concerned policy makers and stakeholders to implement a set of reduction management options against Xylella fastidiosa subsp. fastidiosa at both national and wine growers’ levels. This re-emerging alien biota should not be neglected in this country. This understanding of the potential direct economic impact of Xylella fastidiosa subsp. fastidiosa and the private management costs can also benefit further larger-scale studies covering other potential infection areas and plant hosts.

Rentiers of the low-carbon economy? Renewable energy's extractive fiscal geographies

Progressive movements today call for transformative state-led investment in renewable energy and other climate infrastructures—in the United States, a vision that confronts inherited legacies of austerity. I argue that a significant obstacle is the neoliberal toolkit through which the US federal government subsidizes renewables, an indirect, highly opaque system of tax credits and incentives. For forty years, tax subsidies have ‘paid’ private financial players to invest in renewables, via allowing them to claim legal tax shelters against their other income. In this political economic analysis, I question, first, how US renewable energy acquired this peculiar form of public finance ‘through the tax code’, unique in the global industry. Second, I explore how the model has shaped US renewables financing, development, and ownership. I center two decisive moments: the California ‘wind rush’ in the 1980s, and the ongoing renewables boom of the last fifteen years. This history articulates financial experiments and tax sheltering scandals of the Reagan Administration with exploitation returned today in more organized (and lucrative) form, as ‘tax equity’ finance. Via tax equity, a handful of major US banks dominate financing for renewables and other politically embattled public goods. They exert a troubling ability to extract rents for their capital, gatekeep what projects get built and by whom, and stall US renewables development altogether. Today, the practice is increasingly strained by these and other problems—growing public costs, private capacity ceilings, and amplification of sectoral crises. Under Biden, it faces probable reform, but may need more comprehensive reimagination.

MODELS OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN LITHUANIA AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Public transport is recognized as a more environmentally friendly mode of transport than cars for the same number of passengers. Many countries are investing heavily in public transport to make it not only greener, but also more convenient, more attractive, faster, more competitive and more accessible. In order to promote a sustainable environment, private, public and non-motorized transport must functionally complement each other to form balanced integrated systems. There are currently two main forms of organizing public transport: a government-oriented service and a market-oriented service. Positive changes in the field of public transport are possible if in the process involves not only state and municipal institutions, but also infrastructure planners, passenger carriers and inhabitants. Public transport must be seen as a means of developing cities and regions. The aim of the article is to analyze the existing models of public transport organization and management, to compare them and submit a proposal, on the basis of which management model it would be possible to submit proposals for the improvement of the organization of Lithuanian public transport. Good foreign countries practice in the management and organization of public transport shows that in some countries public transport is already organized not by individual municipalities but by regions. Based on the achievements of foreign countries, municipalities are recommended to cooperate and share experience in creating a common public transport network. It is necessary to create a management scheme in Lithuania for the development of public transport services, which at the same time would reduce public costs.

Estimating the broader fiscal consequences of acute hepatic porphyria (AHP) with recurrent attacks in Belgium using a public economic analytic framework

Background Acute hepatic porphyria (AHP) is a rare, debilitating disease characterized by potentially life-threatening attacks often resulting in chronic symptoms that negatively impact daily functioning and quality of life. Symptoms of AHP prevent many individuals from working and achieving lifetime work averages. The aim of this study was to apply a public economic framework to evaluate AHP in Belgium, taking into consideration a broad range of costs that are relevant to government in relation to social benefit payments and lifetime taxes paid. Methodology A public economic framework was developed exploring lifetime costs for government attributed to an individual with AHP and recurrent attacks in Belgium. Work-activity and lifetime direct taxes paid, indirect consumption taxes and requirements for public benefits were estimated based on established clinical pathways for AHP and compared to the general population (GP). The model includes AHP-related healthcare costs and non-AHP healthcare costs for the GP. Results Lifetime earnings are reduced in an individual with AHP by €347,802 per person (p.p.), translating to reduced lifetime taxes paid of €183,187 for an AHP individual compared to the GP. We estimate increased lifetime disability benefit support of €247,242 for an AHP individual compared to GP. Lifetime healthcare costs for a person with AHP were estimated to be €3,030,316 due to frequent hospitalisations associated with porphyria attacks compared to the GP. The lifetime costs for a person with 12 attacks per annum factoring in transfers, taxes and healthcare costs are estimated to be €3,460,745 p.p. Eliminating AHP attacks after 10 years of active disease, thus, enabling a person to return to work increases lifetime earnings by €224,575 p.p. Increased work activity in such individuals would generate an estimated €118,284 p.p. over their lifetime. The elimination of AHP attacks could also lead to reductions in disability payments of €179,184 p.p. and healthcare cost savings of €1,511,027 p.p. Conclusions Due to severe disability resulting from constant attacks, AHP patients with recurrent attacks incur significant public costs. Lifetime taxes paid are reduced as these attacks occur during peak earning and working years. In those patients, reducing AHP attacks can confer significant fiscal benefits for government, including reduced healthcare costs, reduced disability payments and improved tax revenue.

Ocular foreign bodies: evolution of professional roles and public costs in Quebec

Purpose In 2003, Quebec optometrists were legally enabled to extract superficial ocular foreign bodies, with part of this service covered by the universal health insurance. This study analyses the evolution of roles for professionals managing this condition (optometrists, ophthalmologists, emergency physicians and family physicians) and the related public healthcare costs. Methods Data from the provincial health insurance were combined to demographic and annual healthcare workforce statistics. Across professions and sociosanitary regions, variations in annual rates of conditions treated were calculated, as well as variations in public healthcare costs. Linear regression slopes of these variations were used as indicators of linear trends. Results Between 2010 and 2016, the proportion of cases managed by optometrists increases from 32% to 44%, following a significant trend (p < 0.007). For family physicians, the proportion of cases managed decreases from 49% to 33%, following a significant trend (p < 0.0001). The increase in optometrists managing cases is visible in almost all sociosanitary regions, reaching +19%. A significant trend was observed for increasing healthcare costs for optometrists (p < 0.008) and ophthalmologists (p < 0.004) and for decreasing healthcare costs for family physicians (p < 0.001). In 2016, optometrists managed 44% of cases, representing 13% of related healthcare costs. Conclusion In Quebec, optometrists are now the professionals managing the largest proportion of superficial ocular foreign bodies, across the province. There is an apparent shift from the proportion of cases managed by family physicians, which have similarly decreased.

Pass the buck or the buck stops here? The public costs of claiming and deflecting blame in managing crises

When things go wrong, and the government may be to blame, the public support enjoyed by elected executives is vulnerable. Because attribution of responsibility is often not straightforward, elected executives can influence citizens’ evaluations of their performance through presentational strategies, or explanatory frames which describe their roles in the management of the crisis. We examine the effectiveness of two ubiquitous presentational strategies: blame claiming, where the executive accepts responsibility, and blame deflecting, where the executive shifts blame to others. Using survey experiments incorporating stylised and real-world stimuli, we find that blame claiming is more effective than blame deflecting at managing public support in the aftermath of crises. In investigating the underlying mechanism, we find that blame claiming creates more favourable views of an executive’s leadership valence. While elected executives are better off avoiding crises, we find that when they occur, “stopping the buck” is a superior strategy to deflecting blame.