Neuroparenting: the Myths and the Benefits. An Ethical Systematic Review

Parenting books and early childhood policy documents increasingly refer to neuroscience to support their parenting advice. This trend, called ‘neuroparenting’ has been subject to a growing body of sociological and ethical critical examination. The aim of this paper is to review this critical literature on neuroparenting. We identify three main arguments: that there is a gap between neuroscientific findings and neuroparenting advice, that there is an implicit normativity in the translation from neuroscience to practice, and that neuroparenting is a form of neoliberal self-management. We will critically discuss these arguments and make suggestions for ethically responsible forms of neuroparenting that can foster child development but avoid pitfalls.

What do you mean by “palliative sedation”?

Background Sedation in palliative care is frequently but controversially discussed. Heterogeneous definitions and conceptual confusion have been cited as contributing to different problems 1) relevant to empirical research, for example, inconsistent data about practice, the ‘data problem’, and 2) relevant for an ethically legitimate characterisation of the practice, the ‘problem of ethical pre-emption’. However, little is known about how exactly definitions differ, how they cause confusion and how this can be overcome. Method Pre-explicative analyses: (A) systematic literature search for guidelines on sedation in palliative care and systematic decomposition of the definitions of the practice in these guidelines; (B) logical distinction of different ways through which the two problems reported might be caused by definitions; and (C) analysis of how content of the definitions contributes to the problems reported in these different ways. Results 29 guidelines from 14 countries were identified. Definitions differ significantly in both structure and content. We identified three ways in which definitions can cause the ‘data problem’ – 1) different definitions, 2) deviating implicit concepts, 3) disagreement about facts. We identified two ways to cause the problem of ethical pre-emption: 1) explicit or 2) implicit normativity. Decomposition of definitions linked to the distinguished ways of causing the conceptual problems shows how exactly single parts of definitions can cause the problems identified. Conclusion Current challenges concerning empirical research on sedation in palliative care can be remediated partly by improved definitions in the future, if content and structure of the used definitions is chosen systematically. In addition, future research should bear in mind that there are distinct purposes of definitions. Regarding the ‘data problem’, improving definitions is possible in terms of supplementary information, checking for implicit understanding, systematic choice of definitional elements. ‘Ethical pre-emption’, in contrast, is a pseudo problem if definitions and the relationship of definitions and norms of good practice are understood correctly.

Between Kantian Rationalism and Moral Mysticism: The Search for the Grounding of Morality in the Philosophy of A. Jokubaitis

Although it is common to associate the thought of A. Jokubaitis with political philosophy, this article argues that his texts also allow us to talk about a specific moral philosophy of A. Jokubaitis. At the center of it we find an attempt to articulate and discuss the grounding ideas of morality. The article argues that the first two ideas – an idea of unconditional character of morality and an idea of ontological grounding – are related to Kant’s influence on A. Jokubaitis philosophy. These two ideas allow us to explain morality as an autonomous part of reality, which is different from the empirical one but nonetheless real. This part of reality is grounded in the first-person perspective of a moral subject and can be characterized by implicit normativity and unconditionality. The first-person perspective structures a radically different relation to our reality, which allows us to be agents, not simply spectators. Such an interpretation of Kant allows to associate A. Jokubaitis with his contemporary Kantians, such as Ch. Korsgaard, B. Herman, O. O’Neill, and A. Reath. However, the third idea, the one of a person, which becomes more visible in his book Politinis idiotas, transcends the Kantian conception of practical reason and encourages to perceive morality and its grounding in a much wider context. The concept of a person allows A. Jokubaitis to distance himself from Kantian rationalism and integrate social and mystical aspects of morality, which he has always found important.

Normativity of Scientific Laws (II): Aspects of Implicit Normativity

[straipsnis ir santrauka anglų kalba, santrauka lietuvių kalba]Straipsnyje „Mokslo dėsnių normatyvumas (I)“ buvo atskirtas implicitinis ir eksplicitinis normatyvumas ir remiantis Josephu Rouse’u buvo parodyta, kad mokslo dėsniuose glūdi tai, ką Carlosas Alchourrónas ir Eugenijus Bulyginas laiko normatyvo branduoliu. Šiame straipsnyje šis teiginys plėtojamas išskiriant šešis mokslo dėsnių implicitinio normatyvumo aspektus: (1a) bendrąjį ir (1b) specialųjį konceptualinį normatyvumą, susijusį su analitiniu mąstymu ir specialiomis mokslinėmis terminologijomis; (2a) teorinį ir (2b) materialinį episteminį normatyvumą, susijusį su matematiniu ir eksperimentiniu pasaulio apskaitomumu; (3a) siaurąjį ir (3b) platųjį praktinį normatyvumą, susijusį su technologijomis siauresne ir platesne reikšme.

Normativity of Scientific Laws (I): Two Kinds of Normativity

[full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian] This article presents the results of a broader research project which aims to argue for the normativity of scientific laws. Usually scientific laws are regarded as descriptive, which contrasts them to prescriptive norms. To show their normativity, I utilize the logical account of explicitly normative systems by Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin (1971). I identify the characteristic elements of normativity and analyse accounts of implicit normativity in science using those terms to show the affinities of explicit and implicit normativities. The research project continues with the substantiation of the normativity of scientific laws in detail and the results will be presented in Normativity of Scientific Laws (II) (Mets 2018).

Normativity

Something is said by philosophers to have ‘normativity’ when it entails that some action, attitude or mental state of some other kind is justified, an action one ought to do or a state one ought to be in. The philosophical area most distinctively concerned with normativity, almost by definition, is ethics. Arguably, every ethical concept or category involves normativity of some kind. One area of lively debate within ethics concerns the precise kind of normativity that is possessed by different ethical concepts: moral wrongness, virtue, well-being and so on. For example, if an action is wrong, does that entail that there is reason not to do it or just that there is reason to take a certain attitude (blame) towards those who do act in that way? A second way in which ethics is concerned with normativity is in investigating how an ethical proposition’s normative claim might be vindicated and considering whether it actually is vindicated. For example, if an action is morally wrong only if there is reason not to do it, can we then satisfactorily establish that any actions actually are wrong? Yet a third kind of engagement with normativity concerns the very sources of normativity itself. An attempt to vindicate or debunk the implicit normativity of some specific ethical claim will ultimately face the question of what could support claims to normativity in general. Here we find a fertile debate between Humeans, who seek to ground practical normativity in instrumental rationality, and Kantians, who argue that practical reason necessarily includes formal constraints that extend beyond means/end coherence. Philosophical discussion of normativity is by no means restricted to ethics, however. Epistemology has an irreducibly normative aspect, in so far as it is concerned with norms for belief. And the idea that meaning is implicitly normative has sparked some of the most exciting discussions in recent philosophy of language.