Are the European Commission's forecasts of public finances better than those of national governments?

The academic literature in the past has frequently highlighted that the European Commission (EC) tends to provide more accurate public finance forecasts compared with national governments, thanks to its neutrality. The recent conflicts regarding the excessive deficit procedure with Romania and Italy and rule of law with Hungary and Poland raises the question of whether such conclusions are still binding. Therefore, we analysed a panel of forecasts submitted by the national governments with an annual update of Convergence programmes and corresponding EC predictions. Our dataset contains predictions of the general government deficit, revenues and expenditures for EU27 economies and the United Kingdom in the years 2014–2019. First, the analysis shows no meaningful discrepancies between both estimates when the horizon is set at the current year. Forecasts for the next year have equal accuracy in the case of government revenues and expenditures. However, the EC performs worse in the case of the final deficit. Second, cross-country effects are present, but the accuracy is different mainly in the very small economies, that is, the Baltic countries, Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg. Amongst the more populated states, the EC outperforms the Slovakian and Denmark governments but has worse performance than the Irish, Portuguese and Spanish governments. We also do not see evidence of any political bias in the forecasts.

Learning about fiscal multipliers during the European sovereign debt crisis: evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

SUMMARY Identifying fiscal multipliers, that is, the effect of discretionary fiscal actions on growth, is challenging. It requires comparing the realization of growth after a fiscal action to a hypothetical growth path that would have prevailed in the absence of such action. Deriving the hypothetical path usually involves very strong assumptions. This paper helps to relax some of the assumptions, using a unique new data set on the European Commission’s recommendations under the so-called excessive deficit procedure (EDP). These recommendations provide information on both output growth in a no-policy-change baseline forecast and an alternative forecast of growth incorporating the size of fiscal consolidation recommended under the EDP. A comparison of these two alternative scenarios allows us to infer country-specific fiscal multipliers implicitly applied by the Commission in its EDP recommendations for a sample of 24 countries over the period 2009–2015. Our results confirm Blanchard and Leigh’s (2013, 2014) presumption that fiscal multipliers used by forecasters were adjusted upwards during the European sovereign debt crisis, albeit starting from lower than commonly assumed levels. Contrary to Blanchard and Leigh (2013, 2014), we do not find evidence that the ‘true’ ex-post fiscal multipliers systematically exceeded 1 in the early crisis years.

Moderation is waning in Italy-EU conflict

Subject Italy's budget conflict. Significance June 5 marked a resumption in hostilities between Italy and the EU, after the European Commission sent a letter to Rome saying its spending plans were breaking EU fiscal rules. The Commission will now begin the process of implementing an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) against Italy aimed at reducing its deficit and debt. This will likely involve deficit reduction measures that could precipitate the collapse of the populist government. Impacts If an EDP is blocked, efforts to launch it will start again in September if Italy’s budget preview shows Rome not complying with EU rules. An EDP could lead to higher borrowing costs and make it more difficult for Rome to reduce its excessive debt, which is around 132% of GDP. A League-led right-wing government would push for aggressive tax cuts, potentially leaving Italy in the same predicament that it faces now. The implementation of a parallel currency to boost the supply of money would fuel concerns that Italy is prepared to leave the euro-area.

Determinants and implications of the eurozone enlargement

To join the Eurozone (EZ), a candidate country has to fulfil five nominal Maastricht convergence criteria and ensure compliance of national legislation with the acquis communautaire. With this regard special difficulties pose the fiscal criterion relating to the maximum allowed budget deficit of 3 per cent of GDP. If it is not met, the European Commission launches the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Currently, such formula applies to France, Spain and the United Kingdom. Although the issue is not absolutely certain, one can assume that euro will weather the present difficulties and will come out stronger, though the economically unjustified Euro scepticism of some countries is not helping. It may be expected that in the 2020s the European Monetary Union will be joined by all countries that are still using their national currencies and that the EU will be extended to include new member states, enlarging the euro area further. In this article authors are discussing the issue whether Poland will join the EZ in the coming years, considering the challenges of meeting all Maastricht criteria, on the one hand, and the reluctance of the government to give up the national currency, on the other. A mixed method combining the results of qualitative and quantitative research has been used to empirically verify the research question presented.

Determinants and implications of the Eurozone enlargement

Aside from the United Kingdom, which is withdrawing from the European Union, only Denmark has the option of staying outside the single European currency area. All other member states which have not adopted euro as their currency have the right and obligations to do so under the Treaty of Accession. The condition to join the Eurozone is to meet all five nominal Maastricht convergence criteria and to ensure compliance of national legislation with acquis communautaire, or the EU legal order. What poses special difficulties to candidate countries is the fiscal criterion relating to the maximum allowed budget deficit. If it’s not met, the European Commission launches the Excessive Deficit Procedure, EDP. Currently, this procedure is in place for France, Spain and the United Kingdom. In 2015, EDP for Poland was lifted, but there is no certainty it won’t be imposed again at the end of the decade due to the risk of exceeding once more the threshold of public sector deficit, which stands at 3 percent GDP. It is to be expected that in the 2020s the European Monetary Union will be joined by all the countries that are still using their national currencies, including Denmark, and that the EU will be extended to include new member states, enlarging the euro area, too. Although the issue is not absolutely certain, it needs to be assumed that euro will overcome the present difficulties and come out stronger, though the economically unjustified euroskepticism of some countries, especially Poland, is not helping.

Slovakia: perpetual austerity and growing emphasis on activation

This chapter provides an overview of labour market policies in Slovakia since the early 1990’s. Particular attention is given to the 2004 EU enlargement and the onset of EU fiscal stringency since 2010. Unemployment and underfunded labour market policies have been a problem well before EU institutions gained the right to evaluate national budgets and sanction member states. The difficult post-socialist transition, the fiscal discipline needed to introduce the euro and a mandatory private pension system, as well as the excessive deficit procedure between 2010-2014, allowed for limited fiscal space for labour market policies. Punitive measures and underfunded labour offices have become endemic to the system. Alongside budgetary constraints, the incumbent’s partisan leaning also plays a moderate role. Social-democratic governments have emphasised stronger employment protection and higher minimum wages, while right-of-centre parties have supported weaker employment protection, and some of them have proposed an abolition of the minimum wage.