A model of second-order arithmetic satisfying AC but not DC

We show that there is a [Formula: see text]-model of second-order arithmetic in which the choice scheme holds, but the dependent choice scheme fails for a [Formula: see text]-assertion, confirming a conjecture of Stephen Simpson. We obtain as a corollary that the Reflection Principle, stating that every formula reflects to a transitive set, can fail in models of [Formula: see text]. This work is a rediscovery by the first two authors of a result obtained by the third author in [V. G. Kanovei, On descriptive forms of the countable axiom of choice, Investigations on nonclassical logics and set theory, Work Collect., Moscow, 3-136 (1979)].

Preservation of choice principles under realizability

Especially nice models of intuitionistic set theories are realizability models $V({\mathcal A})$, where $\mathcal A$ is an applicative structure or partial combinatory algebra. This paper is concerned with the preservation of various choice principles in $V({\mathcal A})$ if assumed in the underlying universe $V$, adopting Constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel as background theory for all of these investigations. Examples of choice principles are the axiom schemes of countable choice, dependent choice, relativized dependent choice and the presentation axiom. It is shown that any of these axioms holds in $V(\mathcal{A})$ for every applicative structure $\mathcal A$ if it holds in the background universe.1 It is also shown that a weak form of the countable axiom of choice, $\textbf{AC}^{\boldsymbol{\omega , \omega }}$, is rendered true in any $V(\mathcal{A})$ regardless of whether it holds in the background universe. The paper extends work by McCarty (1984, Realizability and Recursive Mathematics, PhD Thesis) and Rathjen (2006, Realizability for constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. In Logic Colloquium 03, pp. 282–314).

Predication, Possibility, and Choice

Bob Hale’s deflationary conception of truth equates the actual (and necessary) existence of a property or relation with the possible existence of a corresponding predicate with appropriate satisfaction conditions. After surveying recent work on developing a semi-formal framework within which to study the deflationary conception, and presenting extant results regarding the extent to which the account supports the second-order comprehension schema, this chapter examines the extent to which the deflationary account allows one to justify various second-order versions of the axiom of choice. The results are primarily negative: choice does not seem to be forthcoming on the deflationary approach, and even assuming the possibility of arbitrary countably infinite linguistic supertasks, a version of the countable axiom of choice seems to be the best that we can do.

Notions of compactness for special subsets of ℝI and some weak forms of the axiom of choice

We work in set-theory without choice ZF. A set is countable if it is finite or equipotent with ℕ. Given a closed subset F of [0, 1]I which is a bounded subset of ℓ1(I) (resp. such that F ⊆ c0(I)), we show that the countable axiom of choice for finite sets, (resp. the countable axiom of choice ACℕ) implies that F is compact. This enhances previous results where ACℕ (resp. the axiom of Dependent Choices) was required. If I is linearly orderable (for example I = ℝ), then, in ZF, the closed unit ball of the Hilbert space ℓ2 (I) is (Loeb-)compact in the weak topology. However, the weak compactness of the closed unit ball of is not provable in ZF.