Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz

Das Lehrbuch erörtert prägnant die wichtigsten Bereiche des gewerblichen Rechtsschutzes (Patent-, Design- und Markenrecht, Wettbewerbsrecht) wie sie Gegenstand der universitären Schwerpunktausbildung sind. Zahlreiche Beispiele und Verständnisfragen erleichtern das Lernen und Wiederholen.

The search for new drugs: a theory of R&D in the pharmaceutical industry

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to use a dynamic model of optimal patent design and, in the presence of information externalities, to study the evolution of technological progress in the context of a pharmaceutical industry. Design/methodology/approach A theoretical analysis approach is adopted to drive the paper’s findings. Findings Pharmaceutical firms with an active drug discovery program behave strategically in their R&D and in the product markets. It is shown that a firm holding an earlier-expiring patent only chooses to proceed with R&D activates when the patent it holds expires if the expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs yielded by this action is positive. The expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs obtained by this firm is then decreasing in R&D costs, increasing in the cumulative quality discovered in the past R&D activates, and decreasing in the number of past R&D activities, etc. Originality/value The preceding literature on the topic works with only one brand, the brand with the highest quality. As well, the demand is assumed to be completely inelastic. In the conventional models of patent design, the role of competitive fringe firms is discussed implicitly. The model presented in this research is a rigorous continuous in-time dynamic model. It considers several differentiated products. Furthermore, the demand for a brand is taken to be a function of income, its price, and the prices of other brands. The interaction of the fringe firm with other patent-holding firms is also explicitly considered under this framework.

Formal options for job descriptions: theory meets practice

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present the possibilities of formal and structural appearances of a job description, with correct content, through corporate examples and the result of a research. Design/methodology/approach The author in this paper aims to demonstrate the possibilities of the design of job descriptions, based on more than ten-year-long, intense, empirical research of job descriptions (cca. 1,200 examined and analyzed items). Findings During the research work, a 2D job description sample has been created, mapped from a 3D job description, based on an earlier research. This 2D sample can serve as a good starting point for companies in the creation of new documents. Furthermore, the process of the formal visualization of job descriptions has been described, and structured and semi-structured formal visualization have been illustrated, with corporate examples. Research limitations/implications A well-visualized job description can lead the employee, the employer and the company as well to comprehension and competence, thus job descriptions become one of the tools of HRD visual management. Practical implications The aim is to support the job description writing process, which therefore will lead to a well-formed and well-structured, attractive, “living” document. Originality/value The form and content of a job description, the aims that it serves and the message it conveys really make a difference. 3D job descriptions are under patent design protection in Hungary (Registration Number: 90 806 D0500121).

Optimal Patent Protection: A Macroeconomic Perspective

The need to balance the positive and negative effects of patent monopoly is at the heart of design and reform of the patent system. However, by scrutinizing prior studies on optimal patent design, this paper has found that the basis for this balanced approach is flawed. Furthermore, a macroeconomic analysis of the patent system confirms that there is no trade-off in patent protection, unless the patent system generates only marginal negative effects. The implication of this finding is that a new patent system design is needed to stimulate innovation directly while minimizing deadweight loss.