upper hemicontinuity
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2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 811-859
Author(s):  
Wei He ◽  
Yeneng Sun

This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite‐ or infinite‐horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove the existence of subgame‐perfect equilibria and the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs in general dynamic games with simultaneous moves (i.e., almost perfect information), which go beyond previous works in the sense that stagewise public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. For alternating move (i.e., perfect‐information) dynamic games with uncertainty, we show the existence of pure‐strategy subgame‐perfect equilibria as well as the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs, extending the earlier results on perfect‐information deterministic dynamic games.


2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey s. Banks ◽  
John Duggan

We provide a general theory of collective decision making, one that relates social choices to the strategic incentives of individuals, by generalizing the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of bargaining to the multidimensional spatial model. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium outcomes in structural and preference parameters, and equivalence of equilibrium outcomes and the core in certain environments, including the one-dimensional case. The model generates equilibrium predictions even when the core is empty, and it yields a “continuous” generalization of the core in some familiar environments in which the core is nonempty. As the description of institutional detail in the model is sparse, it applies to collective choice in relatively unstructured settings and provides a benchmark for the general analysis of legislative and parliamentary politics.


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