Ultimatum Bargaining with Rational Inattention

A seller bargains with a rationally inattentive buyer (Sims 2003) over a good of random quality. After observing quality, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The buyer pays attention to the seller’s product and offer at a cost proportional to expected entropy reduction. Because attention is free off-path, multiple equilibria emerge, many of which are efficient. A trembling-hand-like refinement (Selten 1975) rules out efficiency, delivering complete disagreement when attention is expensive and a unique equilibrium with trade when attention is cheap. In this equilibrium, the buyer overpays for low-quality goods, underpays for high-quality goods, and earns a strictly positive payoff. (JEL C78, D82, D83, D86, L15)

An examination of the relationship between competences and wages of higher education graduates: Evidence from Morocco

To provide research insights in line with the Tuning project approach, we estimate the effects of competences on wages of higher education graduates with work experience. Using the conventional earnings regressions methods (Mincer equation) on data from a survey of graduates, we investigate the way in which the labour market reacts and rewards competences. The results show small significant evidence for an effect of competences on wages in our dataset; however, methodological and social skills display positive payoff returns. Our empirical findings also suggest that the labour market rewards less specialised competences, and unlikely methodological and social competences are deemed more necessary compared to cognitive skills (theoretical knowledge). Finally, wages tend to decrease for those who are female and working in the private sector. Overall, the findings of the study are highly related to the specification and structure of the Moroccan labour markets.Published online: 30 November 2017