Handedness and midsagittal corpus callosum morphology: a meta-analytic evaluation

Following a series of seminal studies in the 1980s, left or mixed hand preference is widely thought to be associated with a larger corpus callosum than right handedness, influencing the interpretation of findings and various theories related to interhemispheric processing, brain lateralisation, and hand preference. Recent reviews, however, find inconsistencies in the literature and cast doubt on the existence of such an association. The present study was conducted to clarify the relationship between hand preference and callosal morphology in a series of meta-analyses. For this purpose, articles were identified via a search in PubMed and Web Of Science databases. Studies reporting findings relating to handedness (assessed as hand preference) and corpus-callosum morphology in healthy participants were considered eligible. On the basis of a total of k = 24 identified studies and databases, random-effects meta-analyses were conducted considering four different group comparisons: (a) dominantly right- (dRH) and left-hand preference (dLH), (b) consistent right (cRH) and non-cRH preference, (c) cRH with mixed-hand preference (MH), and (d) cRH with consistent left-hand hand preference (cLH). For none of these meta-analyses did we find a significant effect of hand preference, and narrow confidence intervals suggest that the existence of population effects larger than 1% explained variance could be excluded. For example, considering the comparison of dRH and dLH (k = 14 studies; 1910 dRH and 646 dLH participants) the mean effect size was Hedge’s g = 0.016 (95% confidence interval: − 0.12 to 0.15; explained variance: < 0.001%). Thus, the common practice of assuming an increase in callosal connectivity based on mixed or left hand preference is likely invalid.

Prisoners

This chapter provides a public health analysis of imprisonment (the loss of personal freedom for short or long periods—including life sentences): the individual and population effects upon morbidity and mortality including suicide and homicide, drug addiction, and mental health. These effects impact the life course of former prisoners and their families, employment, and life expectancy, and have intergenerational impacts upon the children of incarcerated parents. While international data are presented for comparison of the magnitude and characteristics of imprisonment worldwide, this chapter examines the United States most closely. America is an atypical but instructive case study: the nation with the world’s largest number of prisoners and highest rate of imprisonment. Mass incarceration is not seen in other developed democratic nations but the case of America represents an important natural experiment, demonstrating precisely how high rates of imprisonment can become socially ‘toxic’, with damaging consequences for population health, societal well-being, and human rights.

Heterogeneity of Research Results: A New Perspective From Which to Assess and Promote Progress in Psychological Science

Heterogeneity emerges when multiple close or conceptual replications on the same subject produce results that vary more than expected from the sampling error. Here we argue that unexplained heterogeneity reflects a lack of coherence between the concepts applied and data observed and therefore a lack of understanding of the subject matter. Typical levels of heterogeneity thus offer a useful but neglected perspective on the levels of understanding achieved in psychological science. Focusing on continuous outcome variables, we surveyed heterogeneity in 150 meta-analyses from cognitive, organizational, and social psychology and 57 multiple close replications. Heterogeneity proved to be very high in meta-analyses, with powerful moderators being conspicuously absent. Population effects in the average meta-analysis vary from small to very large for reasons that are typically not understood. In contrast, heterogeneity was moderate in close replications. A newly identified relationship between heterogeneity and effect size allowed us to make predictions about expected heterogeneity levels. We discuss important implications for the formulation and evaluation of theories in psychology. On the basis of insights from the history and philosophy of science, we argue that the reduction of heterogeneity is important for progress in psychology and its practical applications, and we suggest changes to our collective research practice toward this end.