Relational Egalitarianism and Democracy

Relational egalitarians argue that democratic institutions are justified by appeal to relational equality. According to the skeptical challenge, equality of political power is not required for relational equality, and the relational egalitarian case for democracy fails. I defend the relational egalitarian justification of democracy. I develop an analysis of social status and show that inequalities of power will not entail inequalities of status. I then show that inequalities of power will robustly cause inequalities of status and argue that this vindicates the relational egalitarian case for democracy, because such theories have a much more pragmatic standard of success for the justification of democracy than conceptual necessity. I consider the objection that if inequalities of power robustly cause inequalities of status, then relational egalitarians should also oppose democratic institutions, because officials such as legislators or judges will have more power than citizens. In reply, I argue that relational egalitarians are only opposed to inequalities of status that mark a failure of recognition respect, and that inequalities of status that follow from democratically licensed inequalities of power will not mark such a failure. I conclude that the skeptical challenge is unsuccessful, and that the relational egalitarian justification of democracy is sound.

Hegel and Marx on the Historical Necessity of the Terror

Hegel is shown to explain the historical necessity of the phase of the French Revolution known as the Terror in terms of conceptual necessity. This conceptual necessity concerns the self-conception and understanding of how the world ought to be characteristic of agents who are committed to the idea of ‘absolute’ freedom. Practical necessity here plays a key role, in that it is the mediating factor between this conceptual necessity and historical necessity. It also enables Hegel to avoid introducing a standpoint that is external to the one of the agents caught up in the historical process that is being explained. Marx explains the Terror in similar terms, and his explanation of it is shown to be related to his critique of the modern state and his critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.

INTEGRATED APPROACH IN ORGANIZING LOGISTIC ACTIVITY

The main theoretical aspects of the features of the formation of the logistics activities of organizations in the modern conditions of the transformation of the world market are considered. The conceptual necessity of using an integration approach in organizing logistics activities, taking into account the influence of factors of the macroeconomic environment, has been substantiated. The main aspects and features of intrafirm and interfirm logistic integration of organizations are interpreted and reasoned, which, in contrast to existing approaches, makes it possible to distinguish this process from its influence on the main activity, taking into account the risk factors. The conceptual factors contributing to the formation of integration processes in the organization in modern conditions of the transformation of the world market are highlighted. It is argued that the modern realities of doing business, regardless of the type of economic activity, necessitate the use of an integrated approach in management when organizing logistics activities. With the help of economic and statistical analysis of the logistics services market in the world, the intensity and need for the use of intrafirm logistics integration are substantiated. The developed theoretical and methodological approach of the integration organization of logistics activities can be applied in practice, taking into account the peculiarities of the economic activities of organizations in modern conditions.

Comments on Fabrice Correia’s “More on the Reduction of Necessity to Essence”

I have long admired Fabrice Correia’s work on the conceptual foundations of metaphysics and his present chapter is a characteristically judicious and original contribution to the subject. He is principally concerned with certain reductive theses that I propounded in “Essence and Modality” (EM; 1994). These are that a metaphysical necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all objects, that a conceptual necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all concepts, and that a logical necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. Given that there are different notions of what it is for a proposition to be true in virtue of the nature of some objects, Correia’s interest is in what notion or notions of this sort might underwrite these various reductive claims and, to this end, he is prepared in principle to relinquish any other desiderata one might wish to impose upon these notions....

Choosing and Refusing: Doxastic Voluntarism and Folk Psychology

A standard view in contemporary philosophy is that belief is involuntary, either as a matter of conceptual necessity or as a contingent fact of human psychology. We present seven experiments on patterns in ordinary folk-psychological judgments about belief. The results provide strong evidence that voluntary belief is conceptually possible and, granted minimal charitable assumptions about folk-psychological competence, provide some evidence that voluntary belief is psychologically possible. We also consider two hypotheses in an attempt to understand why many philosophers have been tempted to view belief as involuntary: that belief is a prototype concept and that belief is a dual character concept. Altogether, our findings contribute to longstanding philosophical debates about the relationship between the will and the intellect, while also advancing scientific understanding of important social judgments.

Human Rights Unbound

This book develops a theory of extraterritorial human rights obligations in international law. It links debates on human rights theory with those relating to extraterritoriality and merges accounts of economic social and cultural rights with those of civil and political rights. It advances four main arguments aimed at changing the way we think about extraterritoriality of human rights. First, it is argued that the questions regarding extraterritoriality are really about justifying the allocation of human rights obligations to specific states. Second, the book shows that human rights as found in international human rights treaties are underpinned by the values of integrity and equality. Third, it is argued that these same values justify the allocation of human rights obligations towards specific individuals to public institutions—including states—that hold political power over said individuals. And fourth, the book argues that title to territory is best captured by the value of stability, as opposed to integrity and equality. If these arguments are successful, their consequence is a major shift in how we view extraterritorial human rights obligations. Namely, the upshot is that all standards in international human rights treaties that count as human rights require that a threshold of jurisdiction, understood as political power, is met. However, on the present account, this threshold is not just a conceptual necessity but a normative one as well. It is needed because it not only describes, but also justifies the allocation of obligations.

Who is the ‘communis’ in sensus communis? A response to Ferrara

Of the many interesting points that Alessandro Ferrara raises in reply to my article, I focus in response on the question of context transcendence for, as well as seeming to lie at the heart of our differences, it is of foundational importance to the tradition of critical theory which influences both our work. I agree with Ferrara about the ‘conceptual necessity’ of context transcendence for critique but I disagree with the assumption that he makes that experientially grounded critique is necessarily inimical to context transcendence. I argue that this need not be the case if we conceive of the transcending capacity of thought in ways that are more compatible with the practical logic of social life, for example, in the historicized terms of a sociolinguistic expressivism. Ferrara’s elision of experientially grounded critique with radical contextualism tout court sets up something of a false dilemma between immanence and transcendence which ultimately serves to justify his reliance on the dubious ahistorical construct of sensus communis. By directing attention away from patterns of agency and struggle and towards a hypothetical normative commonality, sensus communis neutralizes democratic conflict and the political significance of the exemplar. It is not a question of choosing between immanence and transcendence, rather the task that confronts the theorist is to inhabit the space between experiential disclosure and generalizing critique in as productive and dialogical manner as possible. It is within these terms that I suggest a politicized reading of exemplarity.

Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?

According to many, that the normative supervenes on the non-normative is a truism of normative discourse. This chapter argues that those committed to more specific moral, aesthetic, and epistemic supervenience theses should also hold (NS*): As a matter of conceptual necessity, whenever something has a normative property, it has a base property or collection of base properties that metaphysically necessitates the normative one. The main aim in this chapter is to show that none of the available arguments establish (NS*), or indeed the relevant epistemic, aesthetic, and moral supervenience theses. (NS*) is not a conceptual truth. This has considerable dialectical importance. One interesting upshot is that it affords non-reductivists and non-naturalists a novel way of resisting certain prominent supervenience-based objections to their views, including objections that formulate supervenience as a purely metaphysical thesis.

Immanence and Micropolitics

Christian Gilliam argues that a philosophy of ‘pure’ immanence is integral to the development of an alternative understanding of ‘the political’; one that re-orients our understanding of the self toward the concept of an unconscious or ‘micropolitical’ life of desire. He argues that here, in this ‘life’, is where the power relations integral to the continuation of post-industrial capitalism are most present and most at stake. Through proving its philosophical context, lineage and political import, Gilliam ultimately justifies the conceptual necessity of immanence in understanding politics and resistance, thereby challenging the claim that ontologies of ‘pure’ immanence are either apolitical or politically incoherent.