Return on Investment in Mining Companies: Intellectual Capital Aspect

<p>This research to know the relationship between intellectual capital and financial performance as measured by return on investment (ROI) using financial statement data for the period 2012-2016 from mining companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The measurement model Intellectual Capital use Pulic’s model with Value Added Intellectual Coefficient, which are a component of Value Added Capital Employed (VACA), Value Added Human Capital (VAHU) and Structural Capital Value Added (STVA). The analysis used was multiple linear regression. The results of the hypothesis test showed that VACA, VAHU and STVA together significantly effect to ROI. The results showed, STVA and VACA significant effect to ROI, while variable VAHU no significant impact to ROI because it being economic downturn that led to the mining business become lethargic. Further research can add a number of samples or a longer period because the result of this research is limited only 6mining companies into the samples, so that future studies can provide a more perfect. Suggested to reexamine variables during stable economic condition to prove the possibility result which different with this research.</p>

The Possibility of Coherentism and the Stringency of Ceteris Paribus Conditions

Schupbach (2008) puts forward a "possibility result" for Bayesian Coherentism, showing that there exist plausible sets of ceteris paribus conditions that imply that coherence is truth-conducive. Against this result, Schubert (2012) has argued that Schupbach's considered ceteris paribus conditions are "jointly inconsistent". In this article, I first show that Schubert's attempted proof of this claim is fallacious, and hence that the possibility result still stands. Next, I consider a related criticism of Schupbach's result, inspired by Olsson's (2005) constraints on ceteris paribus conditions. This leads to a general discussion of the principle(s) that should guide one in choosing such conditions.

Axiomatic Foundations for Ranking Systems

Reasoning about agent preferences on a set of alternatives, and the aggregation of such preferences into some social ranking is a fundamental issue in reasoning about multi-agent systems. When the set of agents and the set of alternatives coincide, we get the ranking systems setting. A famous type of ranking systems are page ranking systems in the context of search engines. In this paper we present an extensive axiomatic study of ranking systems. In particular, we consider two fundamental axioms: Transitivity, and Ranked Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Surprisingly, we find that there is no general social ranking rule that satisfies both requirements. Furthermore, we show that our impossibility result holds under various restrictions on the class of ranking problems considered. However, when transitivity is weakened, an interesting possibility result is obtained. In addition, we show a complete axiomatization of approval voting using ranked IIA.