Normative Ethics

Normative ethics is the branch of philosophy that theorizes the content of our moral judgments or, as a limiting case, denies that any such theories are possible (the position of the so-called anti-theorists). While meta-ethics focuses on foundational issues concerning the semantics of moral utterance and how our moral views fit more broadly into a general conception of reality, normative ethics focuses on the major theoretical approaches to the content of moral reflection. It is shaped by the historical inheritance of the tradition of moral philosophy in the West in its focus on deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics as the major forms of normative ethical theory. These standard theories have been more recently complemented by the new field of feminist ethics, and innovations in ethical theory have added hybrid theory and contractualism to the list. All of these views continue to be the subject of intense debate and further refinement.

Two Emblems in Brutus' Orchard

Two difficult passages in the second act of Shakespeare's Julius Caesar can be illuminated if each is interpreted as an emblem. Brutus’ troublesome first soliloquy and the strange dialogue among three conspirators about where the sun rises are both moments of great moral intensity; Brutus meditates on the necessity of assassinating Caesar in the first passage and commits himself to the conspiracy during the second. We might plausibly look to iconography as a perspective on such morally intense moments; emblems, certainly, are in keeping with the pageantry, symbolic statuary, ritual, and solemn moral utterance which permeate this play.

Impartiality and Consistency

It is quite commonly held nowadays that universalizability is a purely formal feature of moral terms, or perhaps of moral rules.To say that something is good, it is asserted, implies (in some sense of “implies”) that anything else with the same (relevant) characteristics is also good; to say that Jones ought to do X is to commit oneself to saying that, in the same circumstances, Smith ought to do X. In pointing this out, it is suggested, one is not oneself taking up a moral position, or laying down a particular moral rule, but simply making it clear what a moral utterance is. The principle ofuniversalizability is thus a principle of meta-ethics, not of morality itself. That moral judgments are universalizable, Hare tells us, is an analytic statement: “analytic by virtue of the meaning of the word moral”.