Genesis of Moral Freedom in Kant

In Kant’s writings, we can discover four key moments in the realization of moral freedom: i) The original possibility of being free, ii) The act described by Kant as radical evil, iii) The opposite act, that is, an inner conversion to good, and, finally, iv) The long process of the self-development of virtue extending to immortality. There are further issues such as the double concept of moral evil, and practical temporality. Moral freedom is originally located (and presupposed in Kant’s transcendental deduction) in the individual, her decisions, and the maxims or principles that guide her actions, even though a community (as both a „kingdom of ends” and social reality) provides the scope wherein all this takes place and its socially and historically-situated shapes. This paper tries to systematize these crucial stages of Kant’s moral philosophy with the focus on the concept of virtue.

Kantian Ethics and Utopian Thinking

Is Kantian ethics guilty of utopian thinking? Good and bad uses of utopian ideals are distinguished, an apparent path is traced from Rousseau’s unworkable political ideal to Kant’s ethical ideal, and three versions of Kant’s Categorical Imperative (and counterparts in common moral discourse) are examined briefly with special attention on the kingdom of ends formulation. Following summary of previous development of this central idea, several objections suggesting that this idea encourages bad utopian thinking are briefly addressed: that we cannot count on everyone to follow ideal rules, that even conscientious people disagree in their moral judgments, and that theories that allow exceptions to familiar moral rules create a “slippery slope” to consequentialism.