The system of relevances and enclaves

The system of thematic, interpretational and motivational relevance is the model expounded by Schutz to highlight how the constitution of meaning. The relationship between the system of relevance belonging to different finite provinces of meaning is fundamental. Just as important are the fluctuations in the modes of experiences, in relation to appresentational processes of meaning in the shift from one sphere to another. This paper will focus on the shift from one province of meaning to another, i.e., enclaves. According to Schutz, enclaves can be understood as both symbolic entities and necessary discontinuities in the shift from one finite province of meaning to another, discontinuities that can be identified as vacancies to be filled.

Realidades múltiples y ámbitos finitos de sentido (de W. James a A. Schütz) a la luz del proyecto fenomenológico-trascendental de "Ideas I"

Aunque inicialmente la propuesta de A. Schütz resulta esclarecedora y sugerente, sin embargo, al proponer hablar de ámbitos finitos de sentido en lugar de realidades múltiples (W. James), se puede encubrir una posibilidad de mala interpretación del proyecto trascendental de la fenomenología. Ello estaría en función de la gran importancia que detenta en Schütz no sólo la actitud natural, sino el mundo de la “realidad práctica”. Me propongo plantear esta problemática a la luz del proyecto husserliano de fenomenología trascendental presentado en Ideen I.Although initially the proposal of A. Schütz is enlightening and suggestive, nevertheless, on having proposed to speak about finite provinces of meaning instead of multiple realities (W. James), it is possible to conceal a possibility of bad interpretation of the transcendental project of Phenomenology. It would be depending on the great importance that holds in Schütz not only the natural attitude, but the world of the “practical reality”. I intend to raise this issue in the light of Husserls transcendental phenomenology project presented in Ideen I.

Beliefs, knowledge and finite provinces of meaning: the case for science and the arts

Purpose This paper aims to build around an abductive argument: the epistemological value of the Arts-derived knowledge is equivalent and may be supplementary to that of science, contributing to the literature on the epistemological mistrust between both systems of knowledge. Design/methodology/approach This essay proposes a conceptual model – a tool, in Kuhn’s terms – grounded on the sociology of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Schütz, 1951), to frame the apprehension of reality from a social perspective, and the philosophical pragmatism (Peirce, 2012), considering the fixation of beliefs as the seminal concept that leads to the legitimation of knowledge in society. The proposed conceptual model guides analysis on the epistemological value of the knowledge derived from the Arts and supports reflection on the commonalities between both finite provinces of meaning. Findings Reproducibility, doxastic grounding, community/membership, intersubjectivity and evidence are criteria identified as commonalities between the Arts and Science. Acceptance and legitimation across finite provinces of meaning emerge to produce minimally acceptable objectivity, made possible by the mutual validation of impressions. Research limitations/implications The discussion on greater levels of aesthetic appreciation has been eclipsed by the authors’ intention to find specific epistemological properties of knowledge derived from the Arts. Practical implications As practitioners in applied social science, management researchers are supposed to have mastery over how to apply what they know. So, the findings suggest participation (becoming accepted, first of all) in communities of practice, learning from and contributing to distinct finite provinces of meaning. The role of organizations in the understanding of knowledge derived from the Arts and its application might be that of a protagonist, promoting creativity and innovation through openness to new perspectives on knowledge. Originality/value This essay rescues knowledge as not a justified true belief, but the result of fixed beliefs continuously and socially legitimated. This rescue escapes previous attempts that appeal to Gettier-type counterexamples. A conceptual model was proposed to frame knowledge from a philosophical and sociological perspective and represent a methodological contribution of this essay. The proposition of third-order interdisciplinarity, also represents a contribution, of conceptual nature.

Noetic and Noematic Dimensions of Religious Experience

Phenomenologies of religious experience have been developed by Max Scheler and via Alfred Schutz’s frameworks of “multiple realities” and “finite provinces of meaning.” For both, religious experience resists the pragmatic imperatives of the mechanistic worldview or world of working. Schutz’s paradigm begins with a distinctive noetic religious epoché opening the religious province, in contrast with Scheler’s start with spheres of being (especially the absolute sphere) furnishing the noematic context for religious acts. Scheler’s religious act resembles the religious epoché, but his eidetic analysis highlights the act’s distinctiveness, irreducibility to non-religious acts, and immunity to psychological reductionism. Correlating the religious act with his value theory (the absolute sphere), Scheler better withstands the subordination of religion to the pragmatic imperatives and the absolute to lesser values than does a Schutzian ranking of purposes in the province’s form of spontaneity. Scheler’s absolute personal being, whose revelation one must respectfully wait, supports the Schutzian relaxed tension of consciousness. Respectfulness of persons, the social/communal/critical dimensions of religious experience, religion’s need for critique from theoretical provinces of meaning, and the wariness of idolatrously substituting one’s own finite goods for the absolute can all mitigate the religious imperialism and violence to which absolute commitments can lead.

Considering Finite Provinces of Meaning

This essay considers social science as a finite province of meaning. It is argued that teasing out common-sense meanings from social scientific conceptions is difficult because the meanings of scientific concepts are often veiled in life-worldly taken-for-grantedness. If social scientists have successfully created a scientific province of meaning, attempts to communicate findings outside of this reduced sphere of science should be somewhat problematic.

“Don't go on my property!”: A case study of transactions of user rights

ABSTRACTTwo hours of conversation among three children were examined for oral disputes concerning use of beds in their bedroom. Examination of transcript segments revealed that the children signaled a social order governing use of property and objects. The children were found to negotiate such use on an ongoing basis, and the form and content of the disputes differed dramatically according to whether the beds were being claimed for the purpose of play or sleep. The conversations reflected the ongoing construction and negotiation of social representations, within shared frames or finite provinces of meaning, for use of space and objects. (Ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, property, ownership)