Perceptions of Sexual Assault: Effects of Victim Physiological Arousal and Victim Gender on Jurors’ Decisions

Limited research has assessed juror decision making in cases of female perpetrated sexual assault and the role played by factors such as the victim’s gender, physiological arousal, and participant’s gender in the decision making process. Participants (n = 215) were presented with one of four trial vignettes that varied the perpetrator and victim’s gender and victim’s physiological arousal. The impact of these variables was examined on guilty verdicts rendered, credibility, and blameworthiness of the victim and accused. Results demonstrate that the male victim was blamed more than the female victim. Further, male participants viewed the male victim to be less credible than the female victim. Lastly, male participants viewed the accused to be more credible when the victim was depicted as a male with signs of physiological arousal. The results reveal the disadvantages a male victim of female perpetrated sexual assault may face if he pursues his sexual assault at trial. Keywords: sexual assault, rape myths, juror bias, gender, physiological arousal

Less Evidence, Better Knowledge

In his 1827 work Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Jeremy Bentham famously argued against exclusionary rules such as hearsay, preferring a policy of “universal admissibility” unless the declarant is easily available. Bentham’s claim that all relevant evidence should be considered with appropriate instructions to fact finders has been particularly influential among judges, culminating in the “principled approach” to hearsay in Canada articulated in R. v. Khelawon. Furthermore, many scholars attack Bentham’s argument only for ignoring the realities of juror bias, admitting universal admissibility would be the best policy for an ideal jury. This article uses the theory of epistemic contextualism to justify the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence, and even reliable hearsay, on the basis of preventing shifts in the epistemic context. Epistemic contextualism holds that the justification standards of knowledge attributions change according to the contexts in which the attributions are made. Hearsay and other kinds of information the assessment of which rely upon fact finders’ more common epistemic capabilities push the epistemic context of the trial toward one of more relaxed epistemic standards. The exclusion of hearsay helps to maintain a relatively high standards context hitched to the standard of proof for the case and to prevent shifts that threaten to try defendants with inconsistent standards.