Redemption for Olympic Weightlifting: Is a Doping-Free Future Possible?

The purpose of this article is to find if a doping-free equilibrium is possible in the sport of Olympic Weightlifting. A thorough literature review was conducted as well as a 3 player model (Athletes, Management, Customers) similar to the basic inspection game. It was found that with the new payoffs introduced after the McLaren report, where high level corruption was uncovered and exposed, a doping-free N.E. (Nash Equilibrium) can be achieved. The principal factor was that customers must demand test results from the management of all athletes, and be supportive when dopers are caught. A complete contrast to the current system where the organizations completely control the information flow and decide when and if a negative was found. If this change wasn’t implemented, management would prefer to keep all the tests hidden to ensure that profits would continue to rise. However, this conclusion is the most pareto efficient result as athletes won’t have to use drugs that would harm their body for years to come. And customers can enjoy the continuous advancement of technique and training in Olympic Weightlifting.

Game Theoretical Analysis of Corruption on the Road in Indonesia

This paper aims to analyze the empirical mechanism of the bribery and extortion on the roads in Indonesia. Using a game theoretical approach, the game is played by two representative agents, namely Police and Rider. The mechanism is modeled into two stage games. Stage 1 adopts the 2x2 simultaneous Tsebelis’ inspection game refined by Pradiptyo. Stage 2 illustrates two scenarios of sequential game. Stage 1 proposes that the benefit of enforcing the law gained by the police becomes rider’s important consideration to violate the traffic laws and rules while stage 2 proposes that the benefit of enforcing laws and rules is the important point to avoid bribery. Stage 2 also suggests that the law enforcement institutions may think carefully before increasing the severity of penalties and sanctions suffered by riders because it would increase the likelihood of police to extort the riders. Keywords: Bribery, Extortion, Game Theory, Inspection Game

On the cooperative and competitive aspects of strategic monitoring

Strategic monitoring occurs in myriad situations such as principal–agent relationships, law enforcement and treaty verification. Such situations are generally known as enforcement or inspection games, with the focus largely being on the (counterintuitive) properties of their associated mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. This article instead characterizes the cooperative resolution of the mixed motives of the players involved. It does so through an illustrative decomposition of the enforcement/inspection game into its cooperative and competitive constituent parts. The results are interpreted within an efficiency wage context and the distribution of the saved monitoring costs that cooperation engenders.

New Game Paradigm for IoT Systems

Game theory is a mathematical language for describing strategic interactions, in which each player's choice affects the payoff of other players. The impact of game theory in psychology has been limited by the lack of cognitive mechanisms underlying game theoretic predictions. Behavioral game, inference game, inspection game and Markov game are recent approaches linking game theory to cognitive science by adding cognitive details, theories of limits on iterated thinking, and statistical theories of how players learn and influence others. These new directions include the effects of game descriptions on choice, strategic heuristics, and mental representation. These ideas will help root game theory more deeply in cognitive science and extend the scope of both enterprises.