Xin (trustworthiness)

The earliest and basic sense of xin is ‘being true to one’s word’. While one’s words can be xin (that is, worthy of trust), in most cases xin indicates an excellence of character; it is thought to be the central virtue governing the relationship between friends. Since xin is primarily a virtue, its exercise involves practical reasoning and not a mechanical adherence to one’s promises. Xin later was added to an original list of four cardinal Confucian virtues, though its status as a distinct disposition remained controversial. Buddhist thinkers broadened the sense of the term to include religious faith. This innovation in turn influenced certain neo-Confucian thinkers who then talked about the need to xin (have faith in) one’s innate moral faculty.

The Evolutionary Challenge to Knowing Moral Reasons

The “debunker’s puzzle” asks how it could be that (i) moral non-naturalism is true, (ii) we have moral knowledge, and (iii) evolutionary forces have heavily shaped the workings of our moral faculty. This chapter begins by exploring a prominent attempt to dissolve the puzzle, so-called third-factor views, arguing that they are subject to a variety of objections. This discussion highlights a pivotal claim in the dialectic between debunkers and non-naturalists: the debunker’s puzzle has force against moral non-naturalism only if it incorporates an ambitious claim about how far evolutionary forces have operated on the workings of the moral faculty. Non-naturalists can plausibly reject such a strong claim. Still, debunkers can rightly reply that non-naturalists nonetheless lack an explanation regarding how our moral judgments are linked to normative reality. The chapter argues that, by appealing to constitutive explanations, non-naturalists have helpful things to say about what the link might be.

Universales Morales: la ciencia de la naturaleza humana y el enfoque de la Ética cognitiva

<p><strong>Abstract</strong>: Recent trends in Cognitive Ethics have emphasized the conceptual debts with the development of the Science of Human Nature in the late 1600s and early 1700s. The paper deals mainly with two major theoretical approaches in the cognitive revolution, (1) that is possible to offer an explanation of the cognitive mechanisms involved in moral decision processes in terms of abstract principles allegedly embedded in human nature; and (2) that there might be substantive reasons to assume a moral faculty to account for the capacity to issue a potential infinite number of considered moral judgments.</p><p><strong>Keywords</strong>: Cognitive Ethics, Science of Human Nature, Universal Moral Grammar.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Resumen</strong>: Investigaciones recientes en la Ética Cognitiva han puesto de manifiesto algunas de la deudas teóricas con el desarrollo de la Ciencia de la Naturaleza Humana a finales del siglo XVII y a comienzos del siglo XVIII. El trabajo trata específicamente sobre dos asunciones teóricas específicas dentro de la revolución cognitiva, (1) que es posible ofrecer una explicación de las mecanismos cognitivos responsables de los procesos de decisión moral en términos de principios abstractos que supuestamente están incorporados en la naturaleza humana, y (2) podría ser razonable suponer que existe una cierta facultad moral humana que podría explicar la capacidad de emitir un número potencialmente infinito de juicios morales considerados.</p><p> </p>

Reid's Response to Hume's Moral Critique of Religion

My aim in this paper is to present Reid's answer to Hume's claim that religion is contrary to natural human moral passions. Religion, according to Hume, weakens natural human inclinations toward virtue and invents new species of merit. Reid would respond, first, that morality is indeed tied to human nature, and that Hume fails to recognize that a sense of justice is natural as well. Since justice does not arise within human social conventions, Reid would conclude that justice is not a virtue that is limited to the human domain. Second, Reid would argue that the concordance between natural moral human motives and natural non-moral motives is a sign of design. And third, Reid would argue that uncorrupted religion is one that is faithful to morality and human nature, and that does not distort natural motives. Overall, Reid holds that the moral faculty is a natural human faculty that gives rise to natural inclinations and beliefs, but that these are concordant with religious beliefs and practices prescribed by Scripture.

Reid on the moral sense

Some interpret Reid's notion of a moral sense as merely analogical. Others understand it as a species of acquired perception. To understand Reid's account of the moral sense, we must draw from his theory of perception and his theory of aesthetic experience, each of which illuminate the nature and operation of the moral faculty. I argue that, on Reid's view, the moral faculty is neither affective nor rational, but representational. It is a discrete, basic, capacity for representing the real moral properties of humans and human conduct.

A Reidian Reading of Shakespeare's Macbeth: Exploring the Moral Faculty through Philosophy and Drama

This essay takes a transhistorical leap to connect the philosophy of Thomas Reid to the dramatic presentation of ethical choices in Shakespeare's Macbeth. Juxtaposing the two figures reveals an underlying moral ontology common to both. This shared ontology is remarkably nuanced, ultimately affirming moral liberty whilst decisively registering the fallibility of the ‘moral faculty.’ The final section asks whether the degree of comparability warrants any further speculation, revisiting the question of a ‘common humanity.’

Thomas Reid on Common Sense and Morals

Reid's philosophy of the moral faculty must be interpreted in the context of his philosophical theory concerning the human faculties and their connection with truth. One purpose of this paper is to offer an account of the development of our moral concepts that accords with a proposal of Esther Kroeker (Kroeker 2010) and also my own ( Lehrer 2010 ). Another is to explain how Reid combines an account of the objectivity of moral judgments with the denial of the existence of moral properties, the affirmation of a necessary connection of the moral judgments with sentiment and the accommodation of moral disagreement.