Movement in Repose

How does tradition, a transmission of body and language, disclose a form of life? This article takes as its point of departure Talal Asad’s methodological pivot away from the modern concept of “belief” to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of “form of life.” It elaborates the philosophical and anthropological implications of a rigorous notion of form of life through Asad’s concept of tradition and Martin Heidegger’s rereading of Aristotle’s physis. Interrupting this theoretical argument, a scene from the author’s ethnographic fieldwork with Orthodox Christian ascetics in Lebanon exemplifies the challenge (and insistence) of form of life. The article then turns to consider a powerful reading of form of life grounded in Baruch Spinoza’s theory of emanation and vitalist univocity. While echoing the concerns of this article, Spinoza’s philosophical ethic defers the central question posed by “form of life” by making the latter a world-producing apparatus. That approach to form of life foregrounds the possibility of being other than what one is, rather than the crucial question of “still experience” and its dynamic repose. The article concludes by reading this still experience alongside C. Nadia Seremetakis’s work in Greece, which details the work of stillness and memory, the deathly pain of history, as sites where the cultivation of noncontemporaneous forms of life are brought into relief.

Educational Literature in Russia of the 17th–18th Centuries as a Source for the History of Moral Concepts

The article analyses moral concepts in the educational literature and didactic manuals, which were popular in Russia in the seventeenth – eighteenth centuries. The main sources for the research are the following texts: ‘The Citizenship of Children’s Habits’ (translation of ‘De civilitate morum puerilium’ by Erasmus of Rotterdam), ‘The Honest Mirror of Youth’, ‘Iphika and Hieropolitic’, ‘Arithmetic’ by Leontiy Magnitsky, a translation of ‘Orbis sensu­alium pictus’ by John Amos Comenius, and ‘Didactic Philosophy’ by F.X. Baumeister. The chronological frames of the research are defined as a period of and active ‘appropria­tion’ of moral codes of the European good manners, and the shaping of the ethical language allowing to build both the outer forms of the moral life of the society, and its ethical reflec­tion. Taking into account the educational literature of that period, we may not only reveal its moral concepts, but also outline the general volume of new terms and their definitions. Moral concepts captured the rules of behaviour, moral characteristics of persons, the ethical significance of their labour, education, and upbringing. Studying the educational literature allows us to understand the role of the introduction of basic grammar, arithmetic, and other disciplines in the shaping of the new moral world in its integrity and diversity, to trace the history of formation of moral terms and concepts from didactic ethical compositions to the first manuals of the late eighteenth century, where ethic was presented as a specific field of philosophy. Thus, studying such various sources in the context of the ethic analyzes allows us to do a complex research of the basics of theoretical philosophical ethic in Russia, as well as the commonplace moral language of the Russian society of the epoch of Enlightenment. Largely thanks to these manuals, the categorical and conceptual language of morality was formed in Russian culture.

South African philosophy of life Ubuntu and its significance for understanding non-violence as universal human value

Presented is characteristic of South African philosophical ethic conception Ubuntu, defined is its significance for understanding non-violence as universal human value. Elaborated are three principal components of Ubuntu, i.e. “human being is human being because other people”, “I am, because we are”, “We are single unity”. Analyzed is contribution that is being introduced by Ubuntu in comprehension of non-violence. Shown is that in Ubuntu priorities are affirmation of value of human life and its unity, humanistic relations, solution of conflicts by using dialog and non-violence methods. Conclusion is made that Ubuntu might significantly enrich modern visions on non-violence as universal human value.

“Rural Development” and the Search for an African Development Paradigm

This chapter departs from the premise that African problems demand not African solutions but solutions founded on the principles of African culture and philosophy. The chapter analyzes hegemonic Euro-American-centric ideas of development and rural development from the perspective of the African philosophy of ubuntu. This chapter per the author dismisses the idea of “rural development” because it argues that “rural” is an oxymoron in African culture and philosophy and thus a discourse of a colonial heritage. The chapter understands “rural development” as a narrow Euro-American-centric construction founded on the principles of economism and classism of the Western philosophical ethic and which, according to the chapter, needs decolonization through ubuntu. The chapter further suggests pathways towards an African “rural development” paradigm.

Refining Motivational Intellectualism: Plato’s Protagoras and Phaedo

Refined intellectualism (RI) holds that although an agent’s actions always follow his rationally-produced choices of what is best, those choices can be influenced by non-rational motivational states. Through a contrast with the Protagoras, I argue that RI is not only clearly endorsed in the Phaedo but also central to the philosophical ethic defended in that dialogue. This result raises problems for prevailing developmentalist interpretations of Plato’s moral psychology.

A Ética dos Antigos e a Ética dos Modernos

The aim of this essay is to critically compare ancient ethics with modern ethics, considering them both under one particular aspect, namely, the relationship between ethics and intelligence. In fact, one of the most significant differences between ancient and modern ethics is precisely the divergence in how this relationship is conceived. With this in mind, an appendix is added, dedicated to the philosophy of the 20th Century, the time when the modern conception reaches a crisis point. In the conclusion, I also intend to speak about Christian ethics, which, while not exactly a philosophical ethic, occupies its own peculiar place, so to speak, in the way the relationship between ethics and intelligence is conceived.