Chelpanov: The Psychologist as a Realist Neo-Kantian

This essay explores the writings of Georgij Chelpanov, who recognized the value of both psychology and philosophy, much to the displeasure of all. Chelpanov only very guardedly expressed his own philosophical views, which stand, I conclude, in stark contrast with the neo-Kantianisms of both the Marburg and the Baden Schools. We see that in his earliest writings on spatial perception, he not so much differs with Kant as saw the matter from a different perspective. Nonetheless, he shares Kant’s affirmation that the universality and necessity associated with our representation of space affirms its apriority as a condition of cognition, particularly with respect to mathematics. Chelpanov departs from Kant in rejecting the exclusive subjectivity of space and time, arguing that there is something in noumenal reality that corresponds to our specific representations of an object’s temporal and spatial position. Otherwise, there is no way to account for their specificity, for why a perceived object is here and not there. Chelpanov argues this from a psychological viewpoint, but he acknowledges that Kant argues from a logical viewpoint. Turning to the issue of free will, he, in short, argues for a soft determinism that is quite consistent with Kantianism, even though Chelpanov’s argument is bereft of the metaphysics and the architectonic of Kant’s system. In conclusion, although scholars dispute his allegiance to neo-Kantianism, his philosophical writings demonstrate his subdued advocacy of a neo-Kantianism, albeit one more akin to the transcendental realism of Riehl and Paulsen.

Closing Reflections

In this concluding chapter the main lessons of the book are reviewed, and some further problems for Kant raised. The chapter reflects once again on Kant’s confession that he had found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith, offering a deeper explanation of this claim than was given in the introduction. It then considers the consequences of his having regarded Transcendental Realism as not just false, but rather logically impossible. It asks whether such a view can be reconciled—given Kant’s views on contradiction—with the supposed contentfulness of transcendental illusion or with Transcendental Idealism itself. It raises a problem for Kant’s account of metaphysical error as arising from transcendental illusion. Finally, it evaluates Kant’s claim to have offered an exhaustive critique of speculative metaphysics, arguing that this is unfortunately not the case.

Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism

The core claims of transcendental idealism are examined, according to which empirical objects and empirical selves are appearances and not things in themselves, and pure space and time are nothing but forms of sensibility. Kant is shown to be a relationalist about empirical space and time in holding that empirical space and time are constituted by the spatial and temporal determinations of empirical objects. Furthermore, it is explicated how Kant can be both a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist about empirical objects, empirical selves, and empirical space and time, and how his idealism differs from transcendental realism, as well as from ordinary idealism such as Berkeley’s.

Universals

Immanent realism is the view that some fundamental properties are immanent universals, entities that can exist wholly in different places at the same time that yet only exist when instanced. This chapter develops the proper immanent realist account of the basic properties and relations that appear in our experience. It includes a new understanding of the relation between determinate and determinable universals. Another novelty involves determinable structural universals constituting one fundamental substantial form of ordinary concrete particulars. Various other complexities of modal structure are developed. Cases discussed include phenomenal color, other sensory properties, spatial and temporal relations, causal powers, and substantial forms. Some affinities but also differences with transcendental realism are considered.

Examining the Application of Retroductive Theorizing in Realist-Informed Studies

Introduction: Transcendental realism, the philosophical perspective dealing with the existence of causal powers governed by universal laws of nature, provides a useful framework for research conducted in the social sciences, including the field of health policy and systems research. Transcendental realism has been criticized, however, for offering weak methodological guidance for conducting research. Consequently, realist-informed studies are deemed to be less robust and less transparent, particularly regarding data analysis and synthesis towards evidence generation. In particular, the extent to which retroductive theorizing, the central evidence generating activity in realist-informed research is applied remains unclear, mysterious, and esoteric. We aimed to examine the extent to which retroductive theorizing is applied and described in realist-informed studies. Methods: We conducted a summative content analysis of 311 manuscripts included in this study. The analysis involved the counting and comparisons of the four forms of inference-making methods namely deduction, induction, abduction, and retroduction. This was followed by interpretation of the underlying context in which they were used, for example, the identification and linking of relevant constructs towards the formulation of mechanism-based theories. Findings: We found that the explicit application and description of retroductive theorizing in realist-informed studies remain minimal and inadequate. Abductive reasoning was reported in only 09/311 (2.9%) of the studies while retroduction was reported in [21/311 (6.8%)]. Abduction and retroduction, although central to realist-informed research, are seldom explicitly applied and described in such studies whereas deduction and induction, while they are meant to support retroductive theorizing, continue to dominate the process of theory formulation. Conclusion: While retroductive theorizing is less formulaic, this study highlights further methodological inadequacies within realist-informed studies. We acknowledge that it is difficult to describe inferential logic in the abstract, but recommend that realist researchers should makes their retroductive theorizing an explicit activity illustrating their critical steps in concrete applications for improved transparency and trustworthiness.

The Many Faces of Transcendental Realism: Willaschek on Kant’s Dialectic

After providing a brief overview of Marcus Willaschek's Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics, I critically reconstruct his account of ‘transcendental realism’ and the role that it plays in the dramatic narrative of the Critique of Pure Reason. I then lay out in detail how Willaschek generates and evaluates various versions of transcendental realism and raise some concerns about each. Next, I look at precisely how Willaschek's Kant thinks we can avoid applying the ‘supreme’ dialectical principle (for every conditioned there is a totality of conditions which is unconditioned) to the domain of appearances. Finally, I call into question Willaschek's efforts to appropriate the lessons of the Transcendental Dialectic without following Kant into transcendental idealism.

“Miraculous realism” in Zaitsev’s, Shmelev’s, Bunin’s prose (in context of magical realism, fantastic realism, mystical realism, spiritual realism, etc.)

There are many terms that denote the invasion of the inexplicable into a realistic narrative, such as: magical realism, fantastic realism, mystical realism, spiritual realism, transcendental realism, metaphysical realism, Christian realism, etc. The author suggests the term “miraculous realism” to describe the realistic works in which there are miraculous (means associated with the category of something unbelievable) event inserts are present. Such miracles lead to obvious violations of the laws of nature and do not fit into the “scientific picture of the world”. “Miraculous realism” in Bunin’s prose, in Zaitsev’s and Shmelev’s autobiographical works, considered in comparison to Chekhov’s materialistic method.