Rational Belief

This chapter generalizes the modal theory of subjective reasons to the epistemic domain and combines it with the first-order commitment that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. The result is a modal account of epistemic rationality, according to which there is a safety condition on rational belief distinct from but mirroring the more familiar safety condition on knowledge. The chapter shows that the account delivers plausible closure principles on rational belief and offers a straightforward resolution of the lottery paradox. It also explores the implications of the view for whether it is rational to believe necessary propositions, preface propositions, and Moorean propositions.

Inference

This chapter introduces the Buddhist theory of inference. It begins with the distinction between “inference for oneself” and “inference for others,” and argues that what is of primary importance in epistemology is the category of “inference for oneself.” The chapter then lays out the standard features of the Buddhist account of inferential knowledge, including Dignāga’s appeal to “the three characteristics” of good evidence and Dharmakīrti’s account of three different types of evidence. The chapter concludes with a section on the topic of epistemic closure principles and how such principles might apply to Buddhist accounts of inferential knowledge.

An appraisal of the evolution of some of the main themes in Sosa’s epistemology

In this article, I propose to trace the evolution of three central concepts in Sosa’s epistemology: the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, closure principles, and the safety condition. These three planks played a central role in the early presentations of Sosa’s epistemology, but have recently undergone interesting changes.

Community Participation in Project Closure principles and Performance of Community Water Supply Projects in Kericho County, Kenya

The purpose of this article was to establish the extent to which community participation in project closure principles influences the performance of community water supply projects in Kericho county Kenya. The indicators used included community participation in; project documentation and archiving, procurement closure and bills settlement and project handing over and celebration. The study adopted descriptive survey design and correlation research design. The descriptive survey design was used to describe characteristics of the population being studied whilst a correlational research was used to describe the degree to which variables under the study were related. The target population was 8357 and the sample size was 382. Out of this, 310 positively responded. The sample comprised of households and management committee members. The research instruments included questionnaires, focus group discussion and interview schedules. Stratified proportional sampling and random sampling were used to collect primary qualitative and quantitative data. The data was compiled, given codes and input into SPSS version 25 computer program for statistical analysis and presentation. The study findings showed that community participation in project documentation and archiving (R=0.680, p=0.00<0.05, R2=0.461), procurement closure and bills settlement (R=0.772, p=0.00<0.05, R2=0.595) and project handing over and celebration (R=0.746, p=0.00<0.05, R2=0.554) are significant explanatory variables with respect to project performance at 95% confidence level. Therefore, the study concluded that the community should be encouraged to actively participate more during the project closure process in order to enhance the performance of their community water supply projects.

Quantifiers

Typically the existential and universal quantifiers are regarded as logical expressions. But there are straightforward semantic means for defining all sorts of new quantifiers that have roughly the same syntax as the more familiar quantifiers. This raises the question: Which of these new quantifiers are relevantly similar to the existential and universal quantifiers to count as logical? After introducing generalised quantifiers, we use notions of indiscernibility to investigate how to classify quantifiers as logical or non-logical, focussing especially on the famous Tarski-Sher thesis. Roughly, this thesis states that quantifiers are logical provided they exhibit a certain kind of invariance. We argue that intuitions about non-discrimination are insufficient to establish Tarski-Sher. Then, by considering infinitary logics and closure principles, we raise some further difficulties for attempts to establish Tarski-Sher.

Naturalism and the Idea of Nature

There are many versions of naturalism. In contemporary Anglophone philosophy, the dominant versions are forms of scientific naturalism. After discussing three forms of scientific naturalism – eliminative, reductive, and nonreductive naturalism – I turn to the idea of nature that scientific naturalism presupposes, and I argue that the presupposed idea of nature is inadequate: It does not include everything in nature. I shall argue that all forms of naturalism – even so-called liberal naturalism, a nonscientific version – suffer from presupposed and unargued-for closure principles that limit the scope of reality. Finally, I'll briefly discuss my own view that I call ‘near-naturalism’.