The return of truth: defending the correspondence theory after the liberal/postliberal divide

This article defends the correspondence theory of truth against criticisms of three theologians: Stephen Long, Kevin Hector, and Bruce Marshall. Long's criticisms arise from his metaphysical commitments, Hector's from his anti-metaphysical commitments, and Marshall's from his methodological commitments. I treat Long and Hector briefly, before giving a more extended treatment of Bruce Marshall's attack on the correspondence theory using the slingshot argument of Donald Davidson. I argue that correspondence theories withstand their criticisms. They therefore pose no obstacle to using them in theology.

Facts

The existence and nature of facts is disputed. In ordinary language we often speak of facts (‘that’s a fact’) but it is hard to take such talk seriously since it can be paraphrased away. It is better to argue for the existence of facts on the basis of three connected theoretical roles for facts. First, facts as the referents of true sentences: ‘the cat sat on the mat’, if true, refers to the fact that the cat sat on the mat. Second, facts as the truth-makers of true sentences: the fact that the cat sat on the mat is what makes ‘the cat sat on the mat’ true. Third, facts as causal relata, related in such sentences as ‘Caesar died because Brutus stabbed him’. The so-called ‘slingshot’ argument aims to show that these roles are misconceived.