From hostile worlds to multiple spheres: towards a normative pragmatics of justice for the Googlization of health

The datafication and digitalization of health and medicine has engendered a proliferation of new collaborations between public health institutions and data corporations like Google, Apple, Microsoft and Amazon. Critical perspectives on these new partnerships tend to frame them as an instance of market transgressions by tech giants into the sphere of health and medicine, in line with a “hostile worlds” doctrine that upholds that the borders between market and non-market spheres should be carefully policed. This article seeks to outline the limitations of this common framing for critically understanding the phenomenon of the Googlization of health. In particular, the mobilization of a diversity of non-market value statements in the justification work carried out by actors involved in the Googlization of health indicates the co-presence of additional worlds or spheres in this context, which are not captured by the market vs. non-market dichotomy. It then advances an alternative framework, based on a multiple-sphere ontology that draws on Boltanski and Thevenot’s orders of worth and Michael Walzer’s theory of justice, which I call a normative pragmatics of justice. This framework addresses both the normative deficit in Boltanski and Thevenot’s work and provides an important emphasis on the empirical workings of justice. Finally, I discuss why this framework is better equipped to identify and to address the many risks raised by the Googlization of health and possibly other dimensions of the digitalization and datafication of society.

What Brandom won’t make explicit

In this contribution, I refer to a discussion between Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom on the latter’s normative pragmatics as advanced in Making it Explicit. Parting with Habermas, I intend to show that though both normative pragmatics and formal pragmatics postulate similar discursive ideals, the former, as compared with the latter, is not a particularly well-calibrated critical tool. I argue that whereas Brandom focuses on making conceptual norms explicit, and takes mutual recognition among participants to a linguistic practice for granted, Habermas proposes a universal frame of reference (to oneself, each other, and the world), which delineates what should be taken as a paradigm case of perception and (inter-)action, and thus a normative standard according to which all kinds of human endeavors can be judged. Thus construed, the formal frame of reference points to possible perceptual distortions along any of the three dimensions: the subjective, social, and objective worlds.

Employing and Exploiting the Presumptions of Communication in Argumentation: An Application of Normative Pragmatics

Argumentation occurs through and as communicative activity. Communication (and therefore argumentation) is organized by pragmatic principles of expression and interpretation. Grice’s (1975) theory of conversational implicature provides a model for how people use rational principles to manage the ways in which they reason to representations of arguments, and not just reason from those representations. These principles are systematic biases that make possible reasonable decision-making and intersubjective understandings in the first place; but they also make possible all manner of errors and abuses. Much of what is problematic in argumentation involves the ways in which the pragmatic principles of communication are exploited and the difficulties audiences and interlocutors have detecting and managing these abuses.

The study of argumentation as normative pragmatics

In the study of argumentation there is a sharp and ideological separation between dialectical and rhetorical approaches, which needs to be remedied. The authors show how the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation can be instrumental in bridging the gap. By adopting a research programme that involves engaging in ‘normative pragmatics’, not only the critical normative and the empirical descriptive dimensions of the study of argumentation can be brought together, but also the dialectical and the rhetorical perspectives. In the research programme, which includes philosophical, theoretical, analytical, empirical and practical components, dialectical and rhetorical perspectives are articulated in each component. The authors make clear that the two perspectives can be reconciled with the help of the notion of ‘strategic manoeuvring’. Strategic manoeuvring, which is inherent in argumentative discourse, is aimed at reconciling the simultaneous pursuit of dialectical and rhetorical aims.