Reasons in Action

The principal aim of this book is to analyse what it is to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally do what we have a reason for doing and intentionally attain the end for which we perform this action, as specified by the reason. The analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, but it is considered how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts. It is also adapted to fit the notion of letting something be the case by refraining from acting. The analysis of intentional action presented is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinctive of the domain of action theory, such as a unique type of agent-causation, or irreducible mental acts, like acts of will, volitions, decisions, or tryings. Nor does it appeal to any unanalysed attitudes or states essentially related to intentional action, like intentions and desires to act. Instead, the intentionality of actions is construed as springing from desires conceived as physical states of agents which cause facts because of the way these agents think of them. A sense of our having responsibility that is sufficent for our acting for reasons is also sketched.

What Does it Take to Act for Moral Reasons?

It is better to give money to charity, say, for the sake of those in need, in response to moral reasons, rather than for reasons of self-interest. But what does responding to moral reasons involve? According to the Rational Guidance account, in order to act for moral reasons you need to be consciously aware of them as your reasons, and be guided by them in choosing your action. But there are several strong arguments against this theory. The chapter argues that to act for moral reasons, you need to treat the moral considerations as a reason. This treating as a reason is explained as the manifestation of a bundle of dispositions to act and draw practical conclusions on that basis. And though acting for reasons does not require conscious awareness of those reasons, a full appreciation of those reasons does involve that.