Bank loans denominated and indexed to foreign currency ‒ a Polish, Ukrainian or Europe-Wide problem?

The institution of a bank mortgage denominated/indexed to foreign currency (referred to generally and not very precisely as “foreign currency loan” or “loan adjusted to foreign currency”) is an instrument commonly used by a broad group of citizens of European states for acquiring capital with a view to purchasing a housing unit. Until recently, such loans were popular not only in Poland and other countries belonging to the so-called “New Union” (those whose accession took place within the last decade or so: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and Croatia), Austria, Spain, Italy, Portugal, but also outside of the borders of the Union: in Russia, Serbia and Ukraine (however, one difference was the currency in which obligations were evaluated – whilst loans in EU countries were dominated by the Swiss Franc, Ukrainian lendees more frequently relied upon loans “adjusted” to the U.S. dollar). Regardless of differences persisting in legislative regimes, peculiarities of national legal systems and local economic and social conditions, in all those countries doubts have arisen whether a drastic change in currency rate (which results in an obligation to pay off a loan on conditions much less attractive than beforehand) constitutes a legally relevant circumstance that could permit one to release oneself from having to perform one’s contractual duties or, at least, facilitate granting some relief in fulfilling increasingly more onerous obligations towards banks. To discuss the permissibility and legal aspects of foreign currency loan contracts is complicated not only from the juridical point of view, but is also of interest to society, politics and economics. Still, the problem attracts strong emotions, particularly among lendees who took out a foreign currency loan and now feel deceived due to a change of the currency rate. The lendees and their organizations often expect involvement, particularly from EU bodies, where, in their estimation, domestic authorities have failed or “succumbed to the banking lobby”. Unfortunately, having observed the course of events over the last several years, one may surmise that the low number of judgments in cases concerning denominated bank loans, and especially the sceptical approach of the Court of Justice, have generated a lot of disappointment.

A Commentary on Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India Concerning the Bay of Bengal

This article considers the law of maritime delimitation as applied by the Arbitral Tribunal in the 2014 Bangladesh v. India case. The dispute concerned the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two states in the north-eastern part of the Bay of Bengal. The Tribunal's Award covers several important issues which require careful examination, such as the land boundary terminus, the delimitation methodology, the role of objectivity, predictability and transparency in maritime delimitation, and the impact of the established case law on the present delimitation procedures. The commentary analyses the Award from the viewpoint of the law of maritime delimitation and traces how the Tribunal applied and developed the methodology used in maritime delimitation. The key points where the Award advances the law of the sea concern the concavity of the coast as a relevant circumstance and the creation of grey area. The Tribunal made significant pronouncements on the continental shelf, especially, beyond 200 nm. It confirmed the concept of a single continental shelf and reasoned that legal regimes of the EEZ and the continental shelf are independent and separable. However, the creation of another grey area met with strong disagreement from Dr Rao. The author considers the Award and the Dissenting Opinion to argue that the adjustment of the equidistance line raises certain concerns and that the creation of grey area is permissible under UNCLOS.

Ch.4 Interpretation, Art.4.3

This commentary focuses on Article 4.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) concerning relevant circumstances, factors, aspects, or criteria that are to be used in establishing the intention of the parties or the understanding of reasonable persons. Relevant circumstances that are important in contractual interpretation include words used by the parties, internal context of the contract, preliminary negotiations between the parties, practices established between the parties, subsequent conduct of the parties, nature and purpose of the contract, meaning commonly given to terms and conditions in the trade concerned, usages, and policy arguments. This commentary also discusses the weight of the relevant circumstances and the burden of proof of the party that wishes to rely on a relevant circumstance in support of a particular interpretation.

Natural Prolongation and Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 nm: Implications of the Bangladesh/Myanmar Case

This paper is a response to the latestBangladesh/Myanmarcase decided by the ITLOS on 14 March 2012, which is the first case concerning delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. The paper aims to discuss the status and role of natural prolongation in delimiting this area. Natural prolongation constitutes the legal basis for entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Also, natural prolongation should play a role as a relevant circumstance in delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. To address these two issues, the judgment of theBangladesh/Myanmarcase will also be reviewed. Both the interpretation of the meaning of natural prolongation and its exclusion in the delimitation process are not convincing. Hence, the Judgment's future influence on the continental shelf delimitation is limited.

Self-Defense: Reasonable Beliefs or Reasonable Self-Control?

The reasonable person test is often employed in criminal law doctrine as a criterion of cognitive fault: Did the defendant unreasonably fail to appreciate a risk of harm, or unreasonably fail to recognize a legally relevant circumstance element (such as the nonconsent of the victim)? But it is sometimes applied more directly to conduct: Did the defendant depart sufficiently from a standard of reasonable care, e.g., in operating a motor vehicle, that he deserves punishment? A third version of the reasonable person criterion, which has received much less attention, asks what degree of control a reasonable person would have exercised. Many criminal acts occur in highly emotional, stressful, or emergency situations, situations in which it is often both unrealistic and unfair to expect the actor to formulate beliefs about all of the facts relevant to the legality or justifiability of his conduct. A "reasonable degree of self-control" criterion is sometimes the best criterion for embracing these contextual factors. In self-defense, for example, it is conventional to ask whether the actor believes, and whether a reasonable person would believe, each of the following facts: (a) an aggressor was threatening him with harm, (b) that harm would be of a particular level of gravity, (c) his use of force in response would prevent that harm, (d) the level of responsive force he expects to employ would be of a similar level of gravity, (e) if the force was not used, the threatened harm would occur immediately, and (f ) no nonviolent or less forceful alternatives were available whereby the threat could be avoided. United States law typically requires an affirmative answer to each of these questions. Yet in many cases, an actor threatened with harm will actually have no beliefs at all about most of these matters. It would be unfair to deny a full defense to all such actors. At the same time, we should still hold such an actor to a normative standard of justifiable behavior. Specifically, this essay suggests that we reformulate the reasonableness criterion and require this type of actor to exercise a reasonable degree of selfcontrol in response to a threat of force.