debt shifting
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Author(s):  
Gideon Goerdt ◽  
Wolfgang Eggert

AbstractThin capitalization rules limit firms’ ability to deduct internal interest payments from taxable income, thereby restricting debt shifting activities of multinational firms. Since multinational firms can limit their tax liability in several ways, regulation of debt shifting may have an impact on other profit shifting methods. We therefore provide a model in which a multinational firm can shift profits out of a host country by issuing internal debt from an entity located in a tax haven and by manipulating transfer prices on internal goods and services. The focus of this paper is the analysis of regulatory incentives, $$(i)$$ ( i ) if a multinational firm treats debt shifting and transfer pricing as substitutes or $$(ii)$$ ( i i ) if the methods are not directly connected. The results provide a new aspect for why hybrid thin capitalization rules are used. Our discussion in this paper explains why hybrid rules can result in improvements in welfare if multinational firms treat methods of profit shifting as substitutes.


Author(s):  
Franz Reiter ◽  
Dominika Langenmayr ◽  
Svea Holtmann

AbstractThis paper investigates how multinational banks use internal debt to shift profits to low-taxed affiliates. Using regulatory data on multinational banks headquartered in Germany, we show that banks use this tax avoidance channel more aggressively than non-financial multinationals do. We find that a ten percentage points higher corporate tax rate increases the internal net debt ratio by 5.7 percentage points, corresponding to a 20% increase at the mean. Our study also takes into account the existence of conduit entities, which simply pass through financial flows. If conduit entities are systematically located in low-tax countries, previous studies may have underestimated the extent of debt shifting.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Comincioli ◽  
Paolo Panteghini ◽  
Sergio Vergalli

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jarle Møen ◽  
Dirk Schindler ◽  
Guttorm Schjelderup ◽  
Julia Tropina Bakke

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 500-505
Author(s):  
Sebastián Bustos ◽  
Dina Pomeranz ◽  
José Vila-Belda ◽  
Gabriel Zucman

This paper reviews common challenges of taxing multinational firms, using Chile as a case study. We briefly describe key international tax avoidance methods: profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions through transfer pricing and debt shifting. We discuss the prevalent policy to tax multinationals--the arm's length principle--and alternative proposals using apportionment formulas. Novel data from Chile show that multinationals make up a large share of GDP but report lower profit and effective tax rates than local firms. In 2011, Chile implemented a reform following OECD guidelines to enforce the arm's length principle. We discuss potential effects on tax collection and welfare.


2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 134-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barrios ◽  
Diego d'Andria

Abstract Base erosion and profit shifting undermines tax revenues collection and raises public discontent in times when the tax burden has increased significantly for households in most developed economies. In addition, new forms of profit shifting related to intangible investment have emerged rapidly along the traditional use of transfer pricing and debt shifting by multinational companies. In this article, using worldwide company level data for the period 2004–2013, we demonstrate that the sectoral differences in profit shifting are a serious concern from a welfare and policy perspectives. Sectors performing more profit shifting lower their average cost of capital and are thus able to attract more investment to the detriment of sectors less able to dodge taxes. We develop a multilevel model and provide indirect evidence of the welfare costs caused by profit shifting by estimating the cross-sectoral variance of semi-elasticity of declared profit. We also demonstrate that having a larger share of intangible assets is not per se related to more profit shifting and that it may point instead to cross-sectoral differences. Finally, we detect almost no financial shifting and find that the largest part of profit shifting is done by means of transfer pricing.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jarle Moen ◽  
Dirk Schindler ◽  
Guttorm Schjelderup ◽  
Julia Tropina Bakke

2018 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadine Riedel

Abstract This paper provides a brief review of the academic literature that assesses the quantitative importance of tax avoidance behaviour of multinational entities (MNEs) by means of income shifting from high-tax to low-tax affiliates. Existing studies unanimously report evidence in line with tax-motivated profit shifting (despite using different data sources and estimation strategies). In terms of shifting channels, there is evidence consistent with strategic mispricing of intra-firm trade, the location of valuable intellectual property at low-tax affiliates and debt-shifting activities. The quantitative estimates vary across approaches and studies though. The paper moreover stresses that some care should be warranted when interpreting profit shifting estimates as they often rely on non-trivial assumptions.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Ruf ◽  
Dirk Schindler

Abstract This paper presents the general design of thin-capitalization rules and summarizes the economic effects of such rules as identified in theoretical models. We review empirical studies providing evidence on the experience with (German) thin-capitalization rules as well as on the adjustment of German multinationals to foreign thin-capitalization rules. Special emphasis is given to the development in Germany, because Germany went a long way in limiting interest deductibility by enacting a drastic change in its thin-capitalization rules in 2008, and because superb German data on multinational finance allows for testing several aspects consistently. We then discuss the experience of the Nordic countries with thin-capitalization rules. Briefly reviewing potential alternatives as well, we believe that the arm’s-length principle is administratively too costly and impracticable, whereas we argue that controlled-foreign-company rules might be another promising avenue for limiting internal debt shifting. Fundamental tax reforms towards a system with either "allowance for corporate equity" (ACE) or a "comprehensive business income tax" (CBIT) should also eliminate any thin-capitalization incentive.


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