Demographic change, PAYG pensions and child policies

The aim of the paper is to investigate how child policies affect the population growth and to what extent these policies are useful to increase pension benefits of a pay-as-you-go pension system in a small open economy. Specifically, we analyze two different child policies: the provision of child allowances and an educational subsidy. We apply an overlapping generations model in its canonical form, where we consider endogenous fertility, endogenous growth and endogenous aging of the society. From the analysis, we conclude that with a child allowance, there is a consequent increase in the number of children and decrease in pension benefits and life expectancy. On the other hand, we note that with an educational subsidy, there is a decrease in the number of children, and an increase in the pension benefits and the life expectancy, respectively. The model developed aims to complement the models of the Unified Growth Theory.

UNFUNDED PENSIONS AND ENDOGENOUS LABOR SUPPLY

A classic result in dynamic public economics states that there is no welfare rationale for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions in a dynamically efficient overlapping-generations economy with exogenous labor supply. Parenthetically, a welfare justification for PAYG pensions exists if the economy is dynamically inefficient. Under the sufficient condition that the old be no less risk-averse than the young, both these results extend to an economy with endogenous labor supply.