Influencing Mechanism of Patent Alliance on Technical Innovation from Network Effects Perspective

As an important tool to promote the technical standards for enterprises, a patent alliance can reduce transaction costs and lawsuit disputes as well as accelerate the promotion and application of proprietary technologies. Moreover, it can enlarge the installed base and influence consumers’ expectations by exploiting the network effects of technical standards. As a result, it can be one of the most effective paths to resolve the problem of patent thicket and promote innovation. Based on several theories with respect to the network effects, this study analyzed the connotation and composition of network effects for technical standards and constructed a concept model that can influence innovations using a patent alliance. A questionnaire investigation was conducted, and an analysis was performed using the structural equation to examine the factors affecting the innovation of patent tools as well as their acting paths. The main research conclusions of this study are as follows: (1) patent alliance is a double-edged sword for technical innovation. The factors related to the patent alliance and network effect, such as the installation-foundation effect, consumer expectation, and positive feedback effect, promote innovation. However, the lock-in effect in the network effect hinders the innovation. (2) Identification of intellectual property and partners is the key factor that influences patent alliance innovation. (3) Standardization strategies and the government play the least role among all innovation factors influencing patent alliance.

Designing Optimal Software Patents

Patents constitute our foremost policy tool for encouraging innovation.However, because each new technology provides an important input tosubsequent innovation, the exclusive rights conferred by a patent may alsoimpose significant costs upon follow-on innovators. Optimal patent policyshould seek to maximize the patent incentive effect, while minimizingburdens placed on future innovation by tailoring the scope of the patent tothe characteristics of each technological sector affected.In the case of software, recent scholarship has illuminated the innovationprofile of the current industry. Software is characterized by incrementalinnovation, relatively low development costs, and short, volatile productlife cycles. Interoperability and compatibility between complementaryproducts is a major concern, making technical transparency or reverseengineering critical to product development. This suggests a need forrelatively narrow patents that are relatively easy to obtain, and subjectto the exceptions necessary to ensure interoperation and follow-ondevelopment.However, current software patent doctrine bears little relationship to thisindustrial profile. The United States Court of Appeals for the FederalCircuit has set an extremely lax standard of disclosure software patents,resulting in patents scope unconstrained by doctrines of enablement andwritten description. Recent changes that make patent law amenable tosoftware have produced a flood of new applications, allowing firms to adopta patent thicket strategy for licensing leverage. At the same time, FederalCircuit case law suggests that a stringent standard for patentnon-obviousness will be applied to such patents, resulting in relativelyfew valid software patents. Optimal software patent doctrine wouldconstrain scope to deal with patent thicket while lowering thenon-obviousness standard to validate more issued software patents.

How Gene Patents May Inhibit Scientific Research

In this paper, we point out three possible ways gene patents could impede scientific research. First, gene patent laws might exacerbate the culture of secrecy ubiquitous in science. Second, gene patents may limit researchers’ ability to study poly or multigenic diseases without access to all genetic etiologies. Third, gene patents could result in a “patent thicket”.