A variational inequality arising from optimal surrender of variable annuity with lookback benefit

We introduce a variable annuity (VA) contract with a surrender option and lookback benefit, that is, the benefit of the VA contract is linked to the maximum process of the policyholder’s account value. In contrast to the constant guarantee model provided in Bernard et al. (Insur. Math. Econ. 55:116–128, 2014), it is optimal for the policyholder of the VA contract with lookback benefit to surrender the VA contract when the policyholder’s account value is below or equal to the optimal surrender boundary. Thus, from the perspective of the insurer to construct a portfolio of VA contracts, utilizing the VA contracts with lookback benefit along with VA contracts with constant guarantee provides the diversification of early surrenders. The valuation of this contract can be described as a two-dimensional parabolic variational inequality. By converting this into the one-dimensional problem, we obtain the integral equations for the value function and the free boundary. The recursive integration method is applied to obtain the numerical solutions. We also provide comparative statics of the optimal surrender boundaries with respect to various parameters.

Technical Note Alternative Theorem: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies

We prove a new theorem for the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games in which the players’ preferences are neither complete nor transitive. Our result is an alternative version of Shafer and Sonnenschein ([1975] J. Math. Econ. 2, 345–348), He and Yannelis ([2016] Econ. Theory 61, 497–513), Reny ([2016] Econ. Theory Bull.) and Carmona and Prodczeck ([2016] Econ. Theory 61, 457–478).