Nyayasutra against the Pasupata Conception of God

In this paper, I present some possible interpretations of the Nyaya theistic argument, mostly following the analysis of C. Bulcke, highlighting his original interpretation. Other interpretations, which follow the explanations in the Nyayabhasya and the Nyayavarttika, are also presented, as well as an anthropocentric reading introduced by D. H. H. Ingalls, and a sixth possible interpretation suggested by Ferenc Ruzsa. Of course, there are other scholarly accounts of the theistic sutras of the Nyayasutra, but they fall outside the scope of this paper. Before I progress to an analysis of these interpretations, I briefly discuss the development of early Nyaya literature so that we can have a better understanding of this system and the legitimacy of numerous interpretations of the very same sutras.

Does Science Need God? A Theistic Argument from Science

In our paper, we put forward an argument for the existence of God that starts with a description of the goal of science. The fact that science approximates perfect knowledge opens the problem of its status. We proceed to three resolutions of the problem: perfect knowledge is only a kind of fictional idealization; it will be reached by humanity in the future; it is God’s knowledge. We point out the weaknesses of the first two options. Next, we go on to draw the conclusion that it is hardly possible to describe the goal of science without some theistic or near-theistic concepts.

C.S. Lewis as a Central Figure in Formulating the Theistic Argument from Desire

C.S. Lewis made various theistic arguments from the existence of a desire that he called “Joy”, “Romantic” longing or “Sehnsucht”. This paper evaluates Lewis’ contribution to this area of natural theology by situating it within an exploration of: a) the historical roots of such arguments, b) historic theological reflections upon desire, c) historic formulations of theistic arguments from desire, d) Lewis’ contemporaries who made theistic arguments from desire, and e) the contemporary philosophical discussion of theistic arguments from desire. With respect to the contemporary discussion, I focus upon my own defence of a cumulative argument from desire inspired by Lewis’ writings.

The Argument from Intentionality (or Aboutness)

The Theistic Argument from Intentionality (TAI) is a venerable argument for the existence of God from the existence of eternal truths. The argument relies inter alia on the premises that (i) truth requires representation, and that (ii) non-derivative representation is a function of, and only of, minds. If propositions are the fundamental bearers of truth and falsity, then these premises entail that propositions (or at least their representational properties) depend on minds. Although it is widely thought that psychologism—the view that the fundamental truth-bearers are mind-dependent—was refuted by Frege, a psychologistic view of propositions has been undergoing a revival. However, this new psychologism suffers from a problem of scarcity—finite minds cannot generate enough thoughts to play the role of fundamental truth-bearers. This objection paves the way for a revised version of the TAI: only an infinite mind can furnish enough thoughts to play the role of propositions.

Pascal’s wager

Pascal’s wager is a type of theistic argument developed by Blaisé Pascal, a French mathematician of the seventeenth century. There are at least four versions of the wager within Pascal’s posthumously published work, Pensées, each of which is a pragmatic argument. Pragmatic arguments for theism are designed to motivate and support belief even in the absence of strong evidence. They seek to show that theistic belief is permissible, even if one does not think that it is likely that God exists, and then to employ prudential reasons to conclude that one should accept theism. Other theistic arguments – the Ontological Proof or the Cosmological Argument for example - provide epistemic reasons in support of theism: that is, reasons to think that there exists an all-powerful, all-knowing, morally perfect being. According to Pascal, there is good reason to seek to inculcate theistic belief, even if one does not appreciate the evidence in support of theism (see Pascal 1960). The role of the wager, as Pascal conceived it, was to move self-interested individuals towards a perspective in which they could appreciate the evidence for theism. Understood in this way, the wager is not a pragmatic trumping of the epistemic, but a means of bridging the chasm between the pragmatic and the epistemic. The wager has the structure of a gamble, a decision made under uncertainty. Pascal assumed that a person, just by virtue of being in the world, is in a betting situation such that one cannot avoid betting one's life on whether God exists or not. The wager concerning God is forced, one might say, since trying to avoid wagering is tantamount to wagering for one of the alternatives. To wager that God exists is to take steps to inculcate theistic belief. To wager against is to do nothing. Bringing about belief is not an action that one can directly will, but one can take steps to try to bring about belief indirectly. If one wagers on God and believes, then there are two possible outcomes. Either God exists and one may have put oneself in a position to gain an eternity of bliss; or, God does not exist and one loses little, if anything. On the other hand, if one bets against God and wins, one gains little. But, if one loses that wager, the consequences may be dismal. Because the first alternative has an outcome that overwhelms any possible gain attached to nonbelief, the choice is clear, says Pascal, one should wager that God exists.

Argument from Chance

In the article, first I present the atheistic argument from pointless evil and the argument from chance. The essence of the argument from chance consists in the incompatibility of the existence of purposeless events and the existence of a God who planned the universe to the last detail. Second, I would like to show that there is a relation between the evidential argument from evil and the argument from chance. An analysis of the theistic argument from small probabilities is a helpful starting point for the presentation of how the two arguments are related.

An Atheistic Argument from Ugliness

The theistic argument from beauty has what we call an ‘evil twin’, the argument from ugliness. The argument yields either what we call ‘atheist win’, or, when faced with aesthetic theodicies, ‘agnostic tie’ with the argument from beauty.

God, Totality and Possibility in Kant'sOnly Possible Argument

There has been a groundswell of interest in the account of modality that Kant sets forth in his pre-CriticalOnly Possible Argument. Andrew Chignell's reconstruction of Kant's theistic argument in terms of what he calls ‘real harmony’ has aprima facieadvantage in that it appears to be able to block the plurality objection (namely, that even if every modal fact presupposes some ground, this does not entail that all modal facts share the same ground). I argue that it is both textually and philosophically problematic to interpret Kant's argument in terms of real harmony. Then, I set forth an alternative response to the plurality objection which does not require the adoption of the problematic notion of real harmony. Instead, I argue that the objection can be overcome by observing that the argument seeks to ground modal facts as a totality and that, according to Kant, such relations can be accounted for only by their schematization in a single intellect.

The Theistic Argument from Beauty: A Philonian Critique

In this paper I consider an understudied form of the design argument which focuses on the beauty of the natural world and which argues, on that basis, that the world requires a divine Artist in order to explain its beauty. Against this view, one might raise a question concerning the beauty of, and in, this divine Artist. What explains the divine beauty? This kind of explanatory regress objection is exactly like that used by Philo in Hume’s Dialogues to undercut standard versions of the design argument focused on the orderliness of the world. Here I argue that Philo’s explanatory regress objection likewise significantly undercuts versions of the design argument focusing on the beauty of the world.