Epistemology Naturalized: Quine's Intervention in the Debate Concerning the Problem of Knowledge

The present paper attempts critical navigation of what could be referred to as the Quinean Intervention in the debate concerning the problem of knowledge. This problem easily represents the central concern of traditional epistemology, particularly since the modern period. Its retrospective statement finds expression in the ancient definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). Among the problems easily identified with the traditional conception of knowledge is the problem of exhaustive or conclusive justification, which is to form the base of the structure of knowledge. Philosophers across the spectrum of discourse have risen to respond to the problem. Prominent among the position is foundationalism and coherentism as theories of justification. However, these theoretical representations are never able to proffer conclusive justification condition; and so, the traditional problem of epistemology has remained largely unresolved. Several alternatives have therefore been proffered by philosophers across the board. One of such is the project to naturalize epistemology – a programme famously identified with W.V.O. Quine. The paper examines Quine's position to move epistemology from philosophy to psychology. This project, the paper argues, stripped epistemology of its normative status, and therefore cannot be regarded as a philosophical proposal, as philosophy is essentially prescriptive not descriptive, matters of ought not matters of is or matters of values not matters of fact. For this reason, the paper rejects the Quinean project, describing it as a non-epistemic response to an epistemological problem. The paper employs the philosophical method of analysis, clarification and criticism, combining this with the method of reconstruction and clarity.

Rational beliefs

To the extent that a belief is rational, it ought to be held, other things being equal; irrational beliefs should not be held. From traditional epistemological perspectives, the obligation here is narrow, concerning only good reasons for acceptance that constitute sufficient justification or warrant. Recent epistemological trends broaden the viewpoint to include also practical considerations that enter into other rational decisions, such as best use of the agent’s limited resources. A related but weaker conception of rationality appears in philosophy of mind as a necessary coherence requirement on personal identity – roughly, ‘No rationality, no agent’. Such agent-constitutive rationality standards are more lenient than normative epistemic standards, since agents’ belief sets can and often do fall short of epistemically uncriticizable rationality without the agents thereby ceasing to qualify as having minds. Finally, at the widest perspective, long-standing sceptical lines of challenge to rationality of the entire structure of human belief-forming procedures conclude that we can never have the slightest good reason to accept even our most central beliefs. Recent approaches that ‘naturalize’ epistemology into a branch of science tend to exclude such general doubts as insignificant or meaningless; but if distinctively philosophical questions in fact do not fully reduce to regular scientific ones, sceptical-type rationality challenges may instead remain a permanent part of the human condition.

¿Se puede naturalizar la epistemología? Reflexiones al hilode la lectura del libro «La Evolución del Conocimiento» de Antonio Diéguez Lucena

Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es discutir la propuesta de naturalización de la epis­temología que se presenta en el libro «La Evolución del Conocimiento» de Antonio Diéguez Lucena. La conclusión a la que se llega es que el planteamiento de este autor no consigue superar el argumento antinaturalista basado en la evolución (EAAN) de Alvin Plantinga. Y se argumenta que posiblemente ningún intento de naturalización de la epis­temología puede ser capaz de superar este argumento. Por lo que es probable que el enfoque naturalista de la epistemología conduzca a una vía muerta.Palabraza clave: Abstract: The aim of this paper is to discuss the naturalization of epistemology presented in the book «La Evolución del Conocimiento» by Antonio Diéguez Lucena. The conclu­sion reached is that the approach of this author can not overcome the evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) of Alvin Plantinga. Moreover, it will be argued that possibly no attempt to naturalize epistemology may be able to overcome this argument. So it is likely that the naturalistic approach to epistemology leads to a dead end.Key words: Recibido: 23/10/2011. Aprobado: 17/01/2012