Understanding and Inference1

The chapter challenges the inferentialist account of concept possession on which Boghossian relies in Chapter 2 in his account of the transmission of justification by deductive reasoning. Unorthodox speakers who reject the inferences in alleged possession condition can still have the concept by understanding a word for it. In that sense, the inferences are not analytic. Inferentialist accounts of logical constants, theoretical terms (using the method developed by Frank Ramsey, Rudolf Carnap, and David Lewis), and pejorative expressions such as ‘Boche’ are examined and rejected. It is suggested that epistemological questions cannot be reduced to questions in the theory of thought and meaning.

How to Tell If Animals Can Understand Death

It is generally assumed that humans are the only animals who can possess a concept of death. However, the ubiquity of death in nature and the evolutionary advantages that would come with an understanding of death provide two prima facie reasons for doubting this assumption. In this paper, my intention is not to defend that animals of this or that nonhuman species possess a concept of death, but rather to examine how we could go about empirically determining whether animals can have a concept of death. In order to answer this question, I begin by sketching an account of concept possession that favours intensional classification rather than mere extensional discrimination. Further, I argue that the concept of death should be construed as neither binary nor universal. I then present a proposal for a set of minimal conditions that must be met to have a concept of death. I argue that having a minimal understanding of death entails first expecting a dead individual to be alive, and then grasping its non-functionality and irreversibility. Lastly, I lay out the sort of observational and experimental evidence that we should look for to determine whether animals have the capacity for a minimal comprehension of death.

Conclusion

The account of the relation between metaphysics and the theory of content suggests further investigation in four areas: the acquisition of concepts; the detailed accounting of what is involved in possession and acquisition in no-priority cases; the wider application, to other areas, of the principle that Individuation Precedes Representation; and the integration of a metaphysics-involving account of concept possession into the general task of integrating the epistemology and metaphysics of a domain. This concluding chapter looks at the connection between the claims of this book and further possible directions of investigation.

Fully Understanding Concept Possession

Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative.In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly articulated within Christopher Peacocke’s seminal theory. I then discuss four central lines of attack to the view that possession of concepts requires full understanding. I conclude that theorists should acknowledge the existence of indefinitely many cases of genuine concept possession for partially understood concepts and therefore face the determination challenge, namely, the challenge of fully determining concept individuation from concept possession conditions of partially understood concepts.