Domestic arbitral institutions and foreign direct investment

Existing literature focuses on how domestic and international institutions address investor–state disputes and attract foreign direct investment (FDI). However, contractual disputes between foreign and domestic firms are largely neglected. For foreign investors, dispute resolution mechanisms that can effectively resolve contractual disputes are very important as well. In this article, I examine the effect of institutions that conduct arbitrations for disputes between foreign and domestic firms on FDI inflows. Focusing on the within-country variation of China, I find that provinces with CIETAC (China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission) agencies receive a higher level of FDI. These agencies attract FDI because they can credibly signal that local governments are truly willing to treat foreign investors fairly when they have disputes with local firms. In sum, this article highlights an institutional variable that has received little attention in the literature on the politics of FDI.

The Bad, The Wrong, and The Unjust: A Comment on Rondel’s Pragmatist Egalitarianism

In his Pragmatist Egalitarianism, David Rondel proposes a “pluralist egalitarianism” as a pragmatist resolution to longstanding debates over egalitarian justice. On Rondel’s view, egalitarianism has three distinct and irreducible variables. In this comment, I argue that pluralist views generally do not reconcile anything, but instead posit sites of normative conflict that are in principle invulnerable to remediation by human intelligence. I then propose that although Rondel might be correct to identify three distinct sites of egalitarian concern, there remains reason to prioritize what he calls the “institutional” variable.