Acute to random workload ratio is ‘as’ associated with injury as acute to actual chronic workload ratio: time to dismiss ACWR and its components

Aim: The aim of this study is to assess the presence and implications of statistical artefacts created by a commonly used indicator of injury risk in both research and practice: the ratio between acute workload (AL) and chronic workload (CL), named ACWR. Methods: Using previously published data, we generated a contrived ACWR by dividing the AL by fixed and randomly generated CLs, and we compared these results to real data. Results: After reproducing the original analyses with only the ACWR showing effects compatible with higher injury risk (odd ratios, OR: 2.45, 95%CI 1.28 to 4.71), we demonstrated similar findings by dividing AL by the “contrived” fixed and randomly generated CLs: OR=1.95 (1.18 to 3.52) dividing by 1510 (average CL); and OR using random CL= 1.53 (mean), ranging from 1.16 to 2.07. Random ACWR calculated reducing the variance of the original AL further inflated the ORs (mean OR=1.89, from 1.42 to 2.70). ACWR causes artificial reclassification of players compared to AL alone. Finally, neither ACWR nor AL alone confer a predictive advantage to an intercept-only model, even within the training sample (c-statistic = 0.574/0.544 vs. 0.5 in both ACWR/AL and intercept-only models, respectively).Discussion: ACWR is a rescaling of the explanatory variable (AL, numerator), in turn magnifying its effect estimates and decreasing its variance despite conferring no predictive advantage. Other ratio-related transformations (e.g., reducing the variance of the explanatory variable and unjustified reclassifications) further inflate the OR of AL alone with injury risk. These results also disprove the etiological theory behind this ratio and its components. We suggest ACWR be dismissed as a framework and model, and in line with this, injury frameworks, recommendations, and consensus be updated to reflect the lack of predictive value of and statistical artefacts inherent in ACWR models.

Response Functions

Supporters of standard teleosemantics argue that informational teleosemantics turns teleosemantics on its head, because functions are effects but a representation’s information relations concern its causes. In chapter 6, the author responds to this influential objection by explaining that, while functions must involve effects, this is not to the exclusion of triggering causes. According to the etiological theory, which is employed by most proponents of teleosemantics, functions are (roughly speaking) selected effects; however, they can also be selected dispositions or selected causal roles, and so can involve inputs as well as outputs. The author explains that there are response functions (functions to do something in response to something), that sensory-perceptual systems have them, and so can have information-processing functions, at least given a simple causal analysis of information. This clears the path for the causal-informational version of teleosemantics, which ties the contents of (nonconceptual) sensory-perceptual representations to their normal causes, as opposed to the so-called Normal conditions for their use.

Functional Analysis and the Species Design

Chapter 3 is about functional explanation in biology, rather than directly about mental content, but in this chapter the author defends a controversial premise of the methodological argument for teleosemantics (given in chapter 4). The premise is that physiologists and neurophysiologists ascribe normal-proper functions in explaining how bodies and brains operate for significant scientific reasons. How an organic system operates in the here and now depends on the actual causal contributions its components make in the here and now, and yet biologists also describe the normal-proper functions of components when explaining how (and not just why) complex organic systems operate or function the way they do. Central to the biologists’ task is describing systems that are functioning normally or properly (e.g., normal human visual systems, or normal human immune systems). The author explains how this role of a malfunction-permitting notion of function (sometimes called a “normative” notion) is consistent with the etiological theory of functions, but the aim here is not to establish the truth of the etiological theory of functions (which is defended in other works).

Wie aktuell ist Kants Auflösung des Naturteleologie-Problems?

Is Kant’s solution to the problem of natural teleology still relevant? In the science of biology the notions of purposiveness and function continue to have a widespread use. This use appears problematic if one has to understand purposiveness and functions as mind-dependent, that is, as relational properties that an entity aquires only as a means in the context of the achievement of some end present in the mind of some intentional agent. The paper takes a close look at Kant’s argumentation for why we are obliged to think teleologically about organisms and at his non-naturalistic solution of the problem of natural teleology. Finally the power of Kant’s solution is discussed in comparison to the two main contemporary naturalistic analyses of the notion of function in the philosophy of biology, namely the etiological theory and the causal role-account of functions. In der Biologie wird der Begriff der Funktion nach wie vor vielfältig eingesetzt, und auch Fragen nach der Zweckmäßigkeit eines Prozesses oder Körperbestandteils spielen eine Rolle. Die Verwendung dieser Konzepte mit Bezug auf die Gegenstände der Biologie erscheint indes problematisch, wenn Zweckmäßigkeit und Funktionen als geistabhängig aufgefaßt werden müssen, d.h. als relationale Eigenschaften, die ein Gegenstand nur in dem Kontext erwirbt, daß er als ein Mittel zur Erreichung eines Ziels eingesetzt wird, welches im Geist eines intrinsisch intentionalen Akteurs präsent ist. Der Beitrag untersucht detailliert, wie Kant dafür argumentiert, daß wir gezwungen sind, über Organismen teleologisch zu denken, und wie er das Problem der Naturteleologie auf nicht-naturalistische Weise auflöst. Anschließend wird die Leistungsfähigkeit seiner Lösung im Vergleich mit den der beiden dominierenden naturalistischen Analysen des Funktionsbegriffs in der zeitgenössischen Wissenschaftstheorie der Biologie diskutiert, nämlich der ätiologischen Theorie der Funktion und der Analyse von Funktionen als kausalen Rollen.

Clinical Psychology and Evolutionary Psychology: Toward a Dialogue

The growth of evolutionary psychology as a theoretical framework for the study of human behavior has been spectacular. However, evolutionary psychology has been largely ignored by clinical psychology. This article is an attempt to encourage greater dialogue between the two. First, some of the major principles of evolutionary psychology are outlined, followed by consideration of some of the criticisms that have been made of this approach. Second, an attempt is made to trace the influence of evolutionary theory on the history and development of clinical psychology. Third, the authors describe how an evolutionary perspective has enhanced the understanding and study of autism and depression. Finally, some implications of an evolutionary perspective for etiological theory, assessment, treatment, and ethics are discussed.