The Normative Significance of Pragmatic Genealogies

This chapter examines how pragmatic genealogy can affect the space of reasons by addressing four objections to this idea: normatively ambitious genealogies commit the genetic fallacy; if not, they founder on failures of continuity in the conditions securing their normative import; if not, this must be because they deal with universal needs, which severely restricts their explanatory scope; and what counts as a need is anyway eagerly contested. In answering these objections, the chapter shows two ways around the genetic fallacy and addresses the problem of Rortyan irony; it offers a need-satisfaction account of functions or pointfulness and discusses the strategies by which genealogies can secure continuity; it shows that the method is not restricted to explaining anthropological universals and that the state of nature can also be used to model local problems; finally, it explores how genealogies help us navigate contestations of certain needs and conceptions of human agents.

Islamic Origins and the Qur’an

The identification of Islamic origins with the Qur’an and the Qur’an with Islamic origins not only suggests a confusion of origins with authenticity and originality, but also suffers from a genetic fallacy. The nature of the sources is also problematic, with some scholars largely accepting the origins as portrayed in Muslim tradition (i.e. they maintain that both the Qur’an and the sīra are historically reliable) and with scholars who do not accept the historical claim of one or both of the texts. The more judicious use of social theory, which requires us to explain individuals and texts rather than simply posit them as the ground of our explanations, could obviate these theoretical and methodological problems.

Religious Understanding and Cultured Practices

This chapter explores the insights and oversights of projection theories of religious belief (e.g., Feuerbach, Freud). It accepts the notion that religious beliefs are projections developed in religious practices applied to the “transcendent.” But these beliefs are not irrational simply because they originated as projections; this is the genetic fallacy. Rather, all beliefs about the transcendent, including denials of any reality to the transcendent, originate in projecting qualities found in the immanent onto the transcendent. The reasonableness of religious beliefs is argued on analogy with the travails of “A Square” in Edwin Abbott’s Flatland. To distinguish among religious projections, the final section develops standards of appraisal that can be used at least to weed out the less plausible religious projects.

Scientific Realism and the Future Development of Science

Nickles raises many original objections against scientific realism. One of them holds that scientific realism originates from the end of history illusion. I reply that this objection is self-defeating and commits the genetic fallacy. Another objection is that it is unknowable whether our descendants will regard our current mature theories as true or false. I reply that this objection entails skepticism about induction, leading to skepticism about the world, which is inconsistent with the appeal to the end of history illusion. Finally, I argue that we have an inductive rationale for thinking that will lead our descendants to regard our current mature theories as true.

The Critique of Regression

The term regression refers to the idea that a person can return to earlier phases of mental development and the primitive modes of functioning associated with them. A core concept in both conflict and deficit models of development, the idea has nonetheless come under increasing scrutiny from critics who argue that it misleads us into a genetic fallacy whereby we reduce the issues of adolescent and adult development to their childhood precursors. Inderbitzen and Levy (2000) suggest that we focus on transformations, or shifts, in mental organization, instead of on regressions. But discarding the concept of regression has theoretical implications: to adopt instead a focus on shifts in mental organization we must (1) consider our object of study to be the meaning-making person, not isolated instincts or needs; (2) understand conscious and unconscious mental life to be embedded in the here-and-now relational field; and (3) adopt a lifespan model of development. The aim here is to outline a theoretical framework in which we can more fully explore the possibility of discarding “regression” in favor of a focus on transformations in the developmental present.

Social Constructionism: Philosophy for the Academic Workplace

Social constructionism – currently dominant and passing for philosophical wisdom – an academic belief that any social object, institution, idea etc. is dependent on contingent, historical and social conditions, examined by Mark Bauerlein reveals its limited justifi cation. The author refers to the fundamental epistemological distinction between the contents of knowledge and the context of their emergence. He demonstrates how confusing those two different aspects lead to a well known logical mistake, the genetic fallacy. Yet, Bauerlein aims at reasoning that the actual rationale of social constructionism is far-distant from its declared epistemological quest and that in reality it consists in mere institutional benefi ts. Simplifying rhetoric, predictable conclusions and a chance to reduce research time predestine social constructionism to be the excellent methodology for „scholarship in haste”, when productivity standards replaced the model of erudition, refl ection and thorough studying.