Enhancing Autonomy, Authenticity And Selecting The Child With The Best Moral Life

In the human enhancement literature, there is a recurrent fear that biomedical technologies will negatively impact the autonomy and authenticity of moral agents, even when the agents would end up having better capacities and an improved life with the aid of these technologies. I will explore several ways in which biomedical enhancement may improve the autonomy of moral agents and try to show that biomedical methods are, all things considered, beneficial to our autonomy and authenticity. I will argue that there are instances when it’s desirable to limit the autonomy of moral agents and that strict regulations are to be put in place if a great number of people will have easy access to powerful, genetic-altering technologies which can impact the life of future children. I will advocate for using assisted reproductive technologies in order to select the child with the best chance of the best moral life and in doing so I will analyse several procreative principles which have been proposed by different scholars in the genetic enhancement debate and try to determine which one would be best to adhere to. Usually, people place high value on the concept of autonomy and there are many cases in which they end up overestimating autonomy in relation to other moral values. While autonomy is important, it’s also important to know how to limit it when reasonable societal norms require it. Sometimes autonomy is defined in strong connection with the concept of authenticity, in the sense that it’s not sufficient for our choices to be autonomous if they are not also authentic. I will try to defend the idea that authenticity can be enhanced as well with the aid of enhancement technologies which can actually prove beneficial in our quest to improve our own self.

The case for biotechnological exceptionalism

Do biomedical interventions raise special moral concerns? A rising number of prominent authors claim that at least in the case of biomedical enhancement they do not. Treating biomedical enhancements different from non-biomedical ones, they claim, amounts to unjustified biomedical exceptionalism. This article vindicates the familiar thesis that biomedical enhancement raises specific concerns. Taking a close look at the argumentative strategy against biomedical exceptionalism and provides counterexamples showing that the biomedical mode of interventions raises concerns not relevant otherwise. In particular, biomedical interventions throughout raise concerns of informed consent, which only rarely turn up in comparable non-biomedical interventions.

Pessimism Counts in Favor of Biomedical Enhancement: A Lesson from the Anti-Natalist Philosophy of P. W. Zapffe

According to the Norwegian philosopher Peter Wessel Zapffe (1899–1990), human life is filled with so much suffering that procreation is morally impermissible. In the first part of this paper I present Zapffe’s pessimism-based argument for anti-natalism, and contrast it with the arguments for anti-natalism proposed by Arthur Schopenhauer and David Benatar. In the second part I explore what Zapffe’s pessimism can teach us about biomedical enhancement. I make the (perhaps surprising) case that pessimism counts in favor of pursuing biomedical enhancements. The reason is that the worse we take the baseline human condition to be, the stronger are our reasons to try to alter humanity, and the weaker are our reasons to fear technology-driven extinction. The prospect of enhancement, I further argue, gives pessimists a reason to reject anti-natalism.

Achievement and Enhancement

We engage with the nature and the value of achievement through a critical examination of an argument according to which biomedical “enhancement” of our capacities is impermissible because enhancing ourselves in this way would threaten our achievements. We call this the argument against enhancement from achievement. We assess three versions of it, each admitting to a strong or a weak reading. We argue that strong readings fail, and that weak readings, while in some cases successful in showing that enhancement interferes with the nature or value of achievement, fail to establish that enhancement poses an unusual threat to achievement.

Human enhancement

Genetic engineering opens new possibilities for biomedical enhancement requiring ethical, societal and practical considerations to evaluate its implications for human biology, human evolution and our natural environment. In this Commentary, we consider human enhancement, and in particular, we explore genetic enhancement in an evolutionary context. In summarizing key open questions, we highlight the importance of acknowledging multiple effects (pleiotropy) and complex epigenetic interactions among genotype, phenotype and ecology, and the need to consider the unit of impact not only to the human body but also to human populations and their natural environment (systems biology). We also propose that a practicable distinction between ‘therapy’ and ‘enhancement’ may need to be drawn and effectively implemented in future regulations. Overall, we suggest that it is essential for ethical, philosophical and policy discussions on human enhancement to consider the empirical evidence provided by evolutionary biology, developmental biology and other disciplines. Lay Summary: This Commentary explores genetic enhancement in an evolutionary context. We highlight the multiple effects associated with germline heritable genetic intervention, the need to consider the unit of impact to human populations and their natural environment, and propose that a practicable distinction between ‘therapy’ and ‘enhancement’ is needed.