The Langscape of War

This chapter documents the ways in which an aggressively modern war took shape in language in World War One, yielding, in Clark’s notebooks, a real-time engagement with the fleeting diction of vernacular geography at the front, the weapons of industrial warfare, and the diverse taxonomies of mud or sound. It explores the emergence of trench warfare, and its own distinctive patterns of use (and variability), alongside the reconceptualization of fundamental terms such as battle and battlefield. Here, too, is a shifting language of attack and resistance and of ‘them’ and ‘us’, in which air warfare, or amphibious warfare, or gas warfare, or the brief efflorescence of Turpiite, offer striking lexical fertility alongside their new capacities for destruction.

“Make More Offensive Moves”

Chapter 8 focuses on the military components of China’s grand strategy to build regional order. It argues that the Global Financial Crisis accelerated a shift in Chinese military strategy away from a singular focus on blunting American power through sea denial to a new focus on building order through sea control. China now sought the capability to hold distant islands, safeguard sea lines, intervene in neighboring countries, and provide public security goods. For those missions, China needed a different force structure, one that it had previously postponed for fear it would be vulnerable to the United States and unsettle its neighbors. These were risks a more confident Beijing was now willing to accept. China promptly stepped up investments in aircraft carriers, capable surface vessels, amphibious warfare, marines, and overseas bases—all with the goal of building regional order.

Naval Gunfire Support at Iwo Jima

One component of the American amphibious warfare doctrine developed by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps during the interwar period concerned the use of naval gunfire in the softening up of enemy defenses prior to the landing of troops ashore. Historians of the war in the Pacific have traditionally argued that the Americans made mistakes, but that they learned valuable lessons along the way and applied those lessons fairly consistently. This chapter by Donald K. Mitchener asserts that this argument needs modification in the case of pre-assault naval gunfire support at Iwo Jima. It describes how the need to maintain strategic momentum against Japan resulted in a gunfire plan that was not adequate to the task. The chapter also shows how General Kuribayashi, the Japanese commander at Iwo, inadvertently created a defensive scheme that caused the Americans to waste much of the ammunition they expended on their last day of naval gunfire preparation.

To the Jungle Shore

Amphibious warfare was critical to the success of Allied forces in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) during the Pacific War. However, at the beginning of the war both the Australian and United States forces in the SWPA had little knowledge, expertise, or experience in this form of warfare. This chapter by Peter J. Dean traces the development of amphibious warfare in the SWPA through organization, training, tactics, doctrine, and operations. While focusing on the Australian experience and highlighting the evolution of capabilities between 1942-45 through an analysis of the assaults on Lae (1943) and Balikpapan (1945), it contextualizes this experience within General Douglas MacArthur's maritime strategy and the friction inherent in combined amphibious operations in this theater. The chapter highlights the evolution of the Australian Army from a force almost totally unfamiliar with the practice of amphibious operations to one which, in combination with its United States coalition partner, becomes a practitioner par excellence in this form of warfare.

Pintando una acción de difícil práctica: el Marqués de la Mina y táctica de la guerra anfibia

Jaime Miguel de Guzmán-Dávalos y Spínola (1690-1767) was one of the most prestigious soldiers of the Enlightenment. He wrote Máximas para la Guerra, a book of unquestionable value that was published upon his death. In this article, paraphrasing the words of the author mentioned in its title, we aim at studying the precepts of the renowned scientist on amphibious warfare to which he devoted a chapter of his work. Having in mind its unquestionable quality, and being far from the hagiographic idolatry, we are going to run its critical evaluation. Disembarking troops is one of the most complex military operations ever. Our study contains lessons that we consider to be most valuable as well as decisions that we view as not so beneficial. In addition to that we also tackle the aspects that in our opinion could have been presented and analysed by the author and were not included.