UKRAINE BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR WITH RUSSIA

After the Crimean Peninsula was invaded and the amplification of conflicts in South-Eastern Ukraine, it has become obvious that Russia's policy is concentrated on preserving its influence and strategic control over the decisions and political directions taken by the States from the former Soviet bloc. To understand the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the West, as well as to anticipate and counteract a possible future evolution of similar events not only in geopolitical risk states such as Moldavia, but also even in NATO members such as the Baltic countries, Romania or Bulgaria, it is worth paying attention to the geopolitical consequences of the loss of Crimea and the South-Eastern provinces by Ukraine. The article analyses the reason, mechanisms and stakes behind the Russian-Ukrainian war, from both a geopolitical and historical perspective. To understand the way in which different hybrid instruments can be used by the Russian Federation to influence the States in its proximity and, in particular, how their combination leads to effective satisfaction of the aims, it is useful to assess and address the systemic risks and vulnerabilities of States in the concerned areas of Russia and the West in recent years. Keywords: Ukraine; Russian Federation; Crimea; Russian-Ukrainian war; hybrid warfare; limited warfare; maskirovka.

Just War and Just Battle: North Korea’s Attack against the ROKS Cheonan and its Unexplored Discourse of an Unjustified Military Action

In March 2010, a North Korean submarine fired a torpedo against the South Korean ship Cheonan, which resulted in the deaths of 46 sailors. Is its surprise attack justified? The academic examination has rarely been made over whether North Korea’s use of military force is justified in this battle. As the just war theory to date has dealt mostly with major wars, it also can guide us to judge whether this limited warfare is just or not. The just war principles are composed of three axes: before, in and after wars. First, North Korea’s provocation had neither right cause nor right intension because it attacked the Cheonan preventively, not preemptively, and was intended to achieve its domestic objective, the stable succession of the Kim regime. Second, North Korea also did not observe in-war principles in the sense that it attacked and sank the Cheonan unproportionally to maximize the effectiveness of revenge. Third, North Korea was not interested in post-battle settlements but intended to aggravate tensions in the region, which is not compliant with post-war principles. The examination sheds some light on the need to expand the scope of just war principles from war to limited warfare and battles particularly in the sense that it helps restrain unethical warfare and maintain the rules-based international order. This expansion also will contribute to not only the richness of the just war theory but also further leading it to evolve into a grand theory of war.

7 Methods of Combat

This chapter focuses on methods of combat under international humanitarian law. The fundamental idea underlying all humanitarian rules on methods and means of warfare has always been the concept of military necessity. According to the traditional approach, only the use of those means and methods of combat which are necessary to attain the military purposes of war, purposes based on the ultimate goal of overpowering the enemy armed forces, are permitted. Accordingly, the civilian population and civilian objects do not constitute legitimate military targets. Equally prohibited is the deliberately cruel killing of enemy combatants by weapons which uselessly aggravate suffering. Because these principles of ‘limited warfare’ which were formed during the nineteenth century became the nucleus of the (originally customary) laws of war, opinio juris and the practice of the nineteenth century have had a decisive impact on the shaping of modern humanitarian law. The most serious problem of rapidly developing modern warfare proved to be the use of the air force.

Enlightenment Ideals of Limited Warfare

Chapter 4 looks at the doctrines of ius in bello and ius post bellum in the Enlightenment theory of regular war. It argues that the laws of regular war and its conclusion embody maxims of sound policy in the public administration of a war’s destruction. The laws of war are underwritten by the assumption that states share an interest in setting reciprocal limitations on their use of force. But while the rules of regular war can be upheld in self-enforcing equilibria, these are always fragile and unstable. The chapter proceeds by looking at several specific areas in the practice of regular warfare and identifying the strategic logic behind the law and its possible breakdowns. The task of the Enlightenment jurists, as they understood it, was to help rulers and military men better see that it was in their best long-term interests to sustain and comply with the laws of war.

A Matter of Balance: A French Perspective on Limited Strikes

What are the philosophical arguments justifying limited strikes? This essay, as part of the roundtable “The Ethics of Limited Strikes,” adopts a French perspective both because France is, along with the United States and the United Kingdom, one of the states that launched such limited strikes in recent years, and because it developed a limited warfare ethos. There is something specific about such an ethos that makes it particularly receptive to the jus ad vim framework and, therefore, to the issue of limited strikes. This essay also builds on the case of the use (or threat) of limited force in Syria as a response to the country's use of chemical weapons between 2013 and 2018. Presented as a way to “punish” the Syrian regime as much as to “deter” it from using chemical weapons again, these limited strikes are a good illustration of the traditional retributive/preventive dichotomy of penal philosophy. I argue that the moral justification of those strikes should be guided by a consequentialist ethic, preventive rather than retributive. From a consequentialist perspective, limited strikes are justified when they “work”—that is, when they have a deterrent/compellent effect. For that to happen, they need to be credible and imply the potential of an escalation; the challenge being to keep the escalation under control. Carrying the risk of inefficacy at one end of the spectrum and of escalation at the other, limited strikes are indeed a matter of balance.

3. The Evolution of Modern Warfare

This chapter examines how the theory and practice of war has evolved over the past two centuries. It first provides an overview of modern warfare and the transformation in the way that wars are fought. In particular, it charts the decline of limited warfare and considers the ideas of Prussian career soldier Carl von Clausewitz, along with the emergence of the Napoleonic way of war and the legacy of Napoleon Bonaparte with regard to strategy. It then discusses the impact of the Industrial Revolution on the planning for and conduct of war, focusing on the ways that weapons technology transformed both strategy and tactics. It also explores the evolution of naval warfare, how nuclear weapons ended the era of total war, and the rise of revolutionary warfare. Finally, it reflects on how the transition to postmodernity can influence war as a politico-cultural institution.

The Commonwealth of Poland towards Russia in the final stage of the Great Diet (1791–1792)

When the Constitution was ratified on May 3, 1791, establishing good relations with Russia was the most important issue for the security of the Commonwealth. As leaders of the Great Diet noticed that prosperous situation in the Polish-Lithuanian state’s international relations was ending, they suggested Stanisław August to turn to Russia. Because of their initiative, the king introduced several members of the St. Petersburg court to the Guardians of the Laws. Yet, it did not reorient Polish foreign policy. Having strengthened his position, Stanisław August was delaying direct talks with the empress. He was convinced, that to avoid Russian intervention in the Commonwealth’s internal affairs, one should not provoke Russians and appease any internal conflicts. That assumption turned to be wrong, though. Contrary to the views of the vast majority of Polish historians, who believed that Russian intervention in Poland was predetermined, the St. Petersburg court was divided, when it came to the policy on the Polish-Lithuanian state. Some advisers of Catherine II believed, that without a final agreement with German courts, one should not start a war with the Commonwealth, because it would be hard, long-lasting and costly. Yet, views of Polish malcontents and empress’s favorite, Platon A. Zubov, were taken into account, and a military operation was launched, without looking at Vienna and Berlin’s position. A passive diplomacy turned out to be a fatal mistake of the Polish king and his advisers. The concept of a limited warfare was equally wrong. The weak resistance of the Polish army strengthened the position of the empress’s favorite. When Stanisław August’s letter to Catherine II arrived at St. Petersburg, already in the course of war, at the Russian court a group of war opponents took a final attempt to stop hostilities, and start negotiations with the Commonwealth’s ruler. However, successes of empress’s troops, that rapidly moved towards Warsaw after the withdrawing Poles, favored supporters of an armed intervention. The king and his advisers ceased to believe in the possibility of victory too soon, and capitulated at the time, when there was still a chance to continue the war, a prolongation of which by several weeks might have prompted the empress to start peace negotiations. It was a great political mistake, which turned out to be the beginning of the end of the First Republic.